"THE UNITED STATES AND THE HOLY SEE: THE LONG ROAD"
A brief history of U.S.-Holy See Relations by Ambassador Jim Nicholson
Published in book form and reissued in 2004 by 30 Giorni Magazine
It was 1788 and the Pope, Pius VI, dispatched an emissary to Paris to
meet with the diplomat just posted there from the new republic in North
America, the United States. The diplomat was Benjamin Franklin, and the
Pope’s request of him was short and simple: Would it be okay with
President George Washington if the Pope named a bishop in the new land?
Franklin dutifully queried President Washington, and word came back to
tell the Pope he can appoint any bishop he wants for the United States,
since that was what the revolution in the colonies was all
about—freedom, to include religious freedom. The Pope promptly elevated
Jesuit, Father John Carroll, to become America’s first Catholic bishop.
The Pope has been naming the hierarchy of the Church in the United
States ever since, unfettered by governmental interference. This
Franklin encounter began a relationship that eventually led to full
diplomatic relations, but not until 1984, one hundred and ninety six
years later.
Some ask, why did it take so long? Others, why have it at all? Former
Special Presidential Envoy, Henry Cabot Lodge, used to answer that
question by telling a story. Lodge, who represented President Nixon at
the Vatican, told about a friend of his, a Muslim diplomat at the Holy
See. Mr. Lodge had asked his friend why his government thought it was
worthwhile to maintain such a big mission at "a place which did not seem
to concern him very much." The diplomat replied appropriately, "We don’t
want to miss anything."[1]
After one year as U.S. Ambassador to the Holy See, I have seen a lot
and hopefully not missed anything. The Vatican is a world beehive of
ideas, information, intrigue, collaboration, and diplomatic activity. At
our embassy we don’t sell trucks or issue visas, but through this small
state with a global reach we work to solve the big problems of our time.
Both our embassy and the Holy See look at the big picture; our common
goals are broad in scope and often require long-term solutions. While
the United States and the Holy See may sometimes disagree on the means
to achieving these goals, we totally agree that the end-goal is freedom,
peace, and opportunity. When our first ambassador, William A. Wilson,
presented his credentials to Pope John Paul II in April 1984, he said,
"The principles on which our republic was founded, and which continue to
guide our national life, are principles which closely parallel those of
the Holy See." And while it has undoubtedly been a long road to the full
diplomatic relations we enjoy today, the edifice of today’s successful
relations rests upon this foundation of common principles, shared values
and spirit of goodwill.
It has taken us a long time to get to where we are today. We have not
always had the dynamic and versatile relations we have currently. In the
18th century, the U.S. mission to the Holy See (the Papal
States) was put in place primarily to protect U.S. merchant interests.
Not long after the signing of the constitution, the United States began
to recognize the need for American consular representation in Rome,
which at the time was the capital of the Papal States. The first
American consul to the Papal States was Giovanni Sartori, who was
commissioned by President John Adams in 1797. Sartori was one of eleven
consuls to represent American interests in Rome between 1797 and the
fall of the Papal States in 1870.[2]
Despite their status as consular representatives, the papal government
granted what one consul described as "unusual privileges and favors." In
fact, he continued, "They were received at all formal functions on the
same footing with full diplomatic representatives of other nations."[3]
In addition to protecting commercial interests and looking after the
needs of Americans abroad, the consular post offered a unique vantage
point to report on the revolutionary instability spreading through
Europe in the nineteenth century. In a cable from Consul Felix Cicognani
to Washington in 1831, for example, Cicognani reported on the presence
of Austrian troops in the Papal States and the tentative plans of Pope
Gregory XVI to flee to Spain.[4]
Rome was a nexus for collecting valuable information and it became clear
that the legation to the Papal States was an excellent "listening post,"
not only for the Holy See but for all of Europe.
In June 1846, Giovanni Maria Mastai-Ferretti was elected to the
papacy taking the name Pius IX. Pius IX, or "Pio Nono" as he was called,
was a figure judged by some historians to have been a doctrinaire
reactionary. Pius’s election and subsequent liberal reforms initially
enjoyed widespread popularity in the United States and were a driving
force in the mid-nineteenth century movement to establish full
diplomatic relations with the Holy See. To Americans in Rome, expanded
relations seemed natural, but were still resisted by the American public
and the United States Congress. By June of 1847, high-level Vatican
officials were voicing their quiet support for the expansion of
relations between the Holy See and the U.S. Ignoring his critics,
President Polk elevated the position of the American officer from
"Consul" to "Chargé d’Affaires." In his December 1847 address to the
Congress, Polk said that he felt the recent events in the Papal States,
namely the election of Pius IX, warranted the expansion of relations.[5]
Although Polk’s remark occupied only one paragraph buried in a lengthy
speech to Congress, it was a telling sign of the Polk administration’s
receptivity towards a quiet invitation from Pius IX to full diplomatic
relations.
On March 21, 1848, the United States Senate debated an appropriations
bill provided funding for Polk’s chargé d’affaires at the Papal court.
The arguments in favor of elevating the mission in Rome followed two
lines of reasoning. Senator Lewis Cass, for instance, pleased with the
support the Pope was showing for popular revolutions against corrupt
government in Italy, argued in favor of sending a full ambassador to the
Papal States on the grounds that the Holy See exerts a "moral temporal
power." Cass hoped that stronger relations with the Holy See would
strengthen Pius’ liberal reforms and contribute to the development of
more democratic government in the Papal States. In his speech on the
Senate floor, Cass proclaimed, "The eyes of Christendom are upon its
sovereign. He has given the first blow to despotism—the first impetus to
freedom. Much is expected of him…The diplomacy of Europe will find full
employment at his court, and its ablest professors will be there. Our
government ought to be represented there also."[6]
In support of Cass, Senator Edward Hannegan of Indiana voiced the
need for relations because Rome served as an "emporium of the
intelligence of Europe."[7]
Similar to Cicognani’s notion of a "listening post," Hannegan’s
understanding of the Roman legation would be echoed again when
diplomatic relations were again called into question in 1867 and 1984.
The second major argument in favor of formal relations emphasized the
commercial benefits of expanded contact with the Papal States, and its
primary exponent was Senator John Dix of New York. Whereas other
senators, even those in favor of sending a chargé to Rome, had conceded
the commercial insignificance of the Papal States, Dix argued instead,
"Not withstanding the depressed condition of the industry of the Papal
states, there is no country capable of a more rich or varied production;
and if the measures of reform now in progress shall be carried out, and
the social as well as the political condition of the people be elevated
by abrogation of bad laws, I know no State of the same magnitude which
may hope for a high prosperity."[8]
Surprisingly, religious objections to the establishment of relations
were hardly invoked during the debate of 1848. Only a few of those
arguing against sending a chargé d’affaires to Rome claimed such a
mission would serve to establish the Catholic Church in the United
States. Senator Andrew Butler of South Carolina, for example, remarked
that he could find no significant reason to send a representative to
Rome. He argued that "ours is a government which does not allow us to
legislate for religion, and I am not willing indirectly to give
countenance to a mission for religious considerations."[9]
Senator Cass was, nevertheless, quick to make the important distinction
that the United States would be sending a representative to the Pope in
his capacity as a sovereign, not in his spiritual capacity as head of
the Roman Catholic Church. This distinction made by Cass in 1848 is
still one of the founding principles of the U.S. embassy to the Holy
See.
Ultimately, the 1848 Senate appropriations bill passed and that same
year President Polk designated Mr. Jacob L. Martin the first chargé
d’affaires to the Papal Court. Although the United States had enjoyed
official consular relations with the Papal States since 1779, by this
act of 1848 the U.S. formally recognized the Holy See as a full member
of the community of nations. But as Jacob Martin was preparing to head
off to Rome, concerns over religious conflicts of interest lingered.
Secretary of State James Buchanan explicitly instructed Martin to
"carefully avoid even the appearance of interfering in ecclesiastical
questions, whether these relate to the United States or any other
portion of the world."[10] This
point has been reiterated by almost every Secretary of State since.
Early in Martin’s tenure, a wave of nationalism spread through Italy
following in the wake of a French revolution earlier that year. Martin
was worried that the Roman revolutionaries, having aligned themselves
with the American ideals of liberty and freedom would seek his support.
Recognizing his obligations to the Holy See, he prudently decided that
as minister to the Papal government, he could not offer support to
Italian political factions.[11]
Jacob Martin died in Rome in June 1848 and was succeeded by Lewis
Cass, Jr. (Senator Cass’s son) on January 6, 1849. At the time of Cass’
appointment, Pope Pius IX had been forced out of Rome by a revolutionary
government. Soon papal loyalists were engaged in a fierce contest for
power against revolutionary republicans.
Meanwhile, the year 1849 marked the first time a Pope set foot on
American territory. The bizarre encounter occurred just after Pius IX
had fled the revolutionary fervor of Rome for the safety of Gaeta. It
seems that while there, he was visiting with King Ferdinand II of the
Kingdom of Two Sicilies and the queen when U.S. chargé in Naples, John
Rowan, paid a call at the palace. Around this time, it so happened that
the U.S.S. Constitution had moored at the Gaeta harbor. King Ferdinand
expressed a desire to visit the frigate and Rowan felt duty bound to
also invite the Pope to come along for a visit.
The King and Pope were welcomed aboard by the skipper, Captain John
Gwinn. Unbeknown to either head of state, Gwinn had been given a written
order not to welcome the two men on board because they were both
defending their thrones against revolutionaries, and the U.S. wanted to
maintain its strict neutrality. In fact, the U.S.S. Constitution was not
simply a symbol of the United States, but according to admiralty law, it
was extraterritorial U.S. soil.
The Pope spent three hours on board visiting with sailors, dispensing
rosaries to the Catholic crewmen, and even giving a benediction. The
Pope eventually got seasick, was refreshed in the Captain’s quarters,
and departed to a twenty-one gun salute. For his role in the incident,
Captain Gwinn was court-martialed. Before the court-martial could be
executed, however, Gwinn died of a cerebral hemorrhage. Pius IX returned
to Rome in 1850 and lived to be the longest serving pope in history.[12]
Congress elevated the representative in Rome to the rank of Resident
Minister in 1854, and in July 1858, John Stockton succeeded Cass as
Resident Minister in Rome. Stockton, like Cass, inherited an uneasy
political situation in Italy. The move toward unification was again
gaining support among the people of Italy. Like Cass, John Stockton
maintained the tradition of using his perch at the Holy See to report on
the volatile political situation in Italy.
The next Ministers in Rome held office in brief succession. First,
Rufus King, a prominent Republican and the former editor of a Milwaukee
newspaper succeeded Stockton in April 1861. By August, however, a
Brigadier-General in the federal army was appointed to replace Mr. King
before Mr. King even had time to assume his post.[13]
Soon, he too resigned. At the recommendation of King, who seemed to
still be hovering about, Alexander W. Randall was appointed Resident
Minister. Finding his wage to be too low and the protocol too stuffy, he
also soon resigned.[14] Next,
Richard M. Blatchford was appointed Chargé, but not wishing to be
history’s odd man out, resigned by October 1863. Finally, the job
returned to Rufus King, who stayed until the mission was closed in 1867.
Throughout this time of rotating legates in Rome, the political
situation in Italy remained turbulent. In October 1863, King assumed his
post in Rome and began his tenure as what would turn out to be the final
U.S. Minister to the Papal States. King served at a time of challenge
for both the United States, which was engulfed in civil war, and the
Papal States, which was confronting growing challenges to the Holy See’s
temporal authority.
One incident during this period greatly tried American and Papal
relations. In 1863, during the thick of the American Civil War, Pius IX
sent a letter to the Archbishops of New York and New Orleans suggesting
that every effort be made for the cause of peace. Confederate President
Jefferson Davis responded to this letter. Pius IX responded in turn to
Davis, addressing him as the "Illustrious and Honorable Jefferson Davis,
President of the Confederate States of America." To many in the North,
this salutation was seen as a Papal recognition of the Confederate
government. Vatican Secretary of State Giacomo Antonelli disputed this,
insisting that the Pope in no way intended to make a political statement
in his address to Mr. Davis.[15]
Some Americans were satisfied with the Holy See’s claim of neutrality,
but others retained a suspicion of the Holy See’s intentions. The Holy
See would later have an opportunity to make amends.
In 1865, an American named John Surrat enlisted in the Papal army.
Unknown to the Holy See, Mr. Surrat had been indicted with John Wilkes
Booth in the assassination of President Abraham Lincoln. With the
absence of an extradition treaty between the United States and the Papal
States, the United States had limited legal leverage with the Papal
government in its request to extradite Mr. Surrat back to the U.S. in
order to face trial for his role in the assassination. The Papal
government, however, was quick to demonstrate its goodwill, and detained
Surrat until he could be handed over to American authorities. Rufus King
wrote to Secretary of State William Seward that "this was done with the
single purpose of showing the ready disposition of the Papal Authorities
to comply with the anticipated request of the American Government."[16]
This significant act of diplomatic courtesy reflected the cordial
relationship that had been cultivated between the consuls and ministers
of the United States and the Holy See, and the Holy See’s desire to
retain good relations with the post-Civil War U.S. government.
But despite such gestures of friendship, opposition to the mission in
Rome was mounting back in the United States. The critics finally won out
in 1867 when Congress withdrew all funding for the legation in Rome. The
apparent reason was a rumor relating to the religious freedom of
Protestants in the Papal States. From the beginning of the legation in
Rome, Papal authorities had allowed the celebration of Protestant
religious services in the home of the American Minister. When the
services grew, they were moved to a rented apartment under the seal of
the American Legation to accommodate the participants. The news floating
around Washington and being reported in the New York Times was
that the Pope had forced the protestant group outside the walls of Rome.
This, according to Rufus King, the American Minister himself, was untrue
in its entirety.[17] By February
of 1867, Mr. King sensed the seriousness of the rumor now running
rampant in the United States. On the 18th of that month he
wrote a cable to Secretary of State Seward in which he outlined, in his
opinion, reasons the mission in Rome was essential to the diplomacy of
the United States and why it was not advantageous at that point in time
to close it. The next day, in a last attempt to discredit the rumor,
King urgently cabled the State Department saying only, "No truth in
reported closing of American chapel in Rome."[18]
Despite all of King’s efforts to maintain the mission in Rome, on
February 28, 1867 Congress finally passed legislation that prohibited
funding to any future United States diplomatic missions to the Holy See.
Congress had not actually ended diplomatic relations, but had simply
stopped funding the mission to the Holy See. Ultimately, however, the
distinction would make little difference. In an ironic turn of events
which King pointed out in a final cable to Secretary Seward in May, by
pulling the American Minister from Rome the United States had, in
essence, forced the American Protestant services outside of Rome, since
the service could no longer be held under the sovereign seal of the
American Legation.[19] In an even
more confusing turn of events, Rufus King was left without instructions
on how to explain his departure to Vatican officials. He left Rome
without a letter of recall—the proper diplomatic note explaining the
Minister’s departure. In fact, King wrote to Secretary Seward, "The Pope
himself feels hurt by the hasty and apparently groundless action of
Congress and thinks it an unkind and ungenerous return for the good will
he has always manifested towards the American Government and People."[20]
In hindsight, the removal of funding for the mission in Rome was
politically driven and had less to do with the rumor about the American
chapel in Rome, than with Congress’ desire to deliver a political defeat
to the newly inaugurated President, Andrew Johnson.[21]
Still, religious prejudice likely contributed to the actions of
Congress.
While the auspices under which the American Minister departed Rome
were unfortunate, seventy years of consular and diplomatic exchange had
proven fruitful. The post had been successful in its mission of
protecting American citizens in the Papal States, in maintaining
courteous relations with the Pope, and in reporting on the political
situation in Europe. Nevertheless, American representation at the Holy
See would remain only a memory until 1940.
From 1867 on, the U.S. enjoyed only the most informal and irregular
contact with the Holy See, nevertheless, the interaction between the
Holy See and the American hierarchy continued to grow. Throughout the 19th
century and early 20th century, the American Church expanded
in numbers, power, influence, and wealth. With the influx of immigrants
from predominantly Catholic countries in the late 1800s, the United
States became a country of such increasing importance that the Holy See
had no desire to ignore it. During these years, the astute and
politically conscious American bishops, archbishops, and cardinals
maintained close ties to vital organs of our federal government, giving
life to informal channels of diplomatic communication between the U.S.
government and the Catholic Church.
In 1892, Pope Leo XIII appointed Archbishop Francesco Satolli to be
the apostolic delegate to the American hierarchy. In order to minimize
controversy and parry further public sentiments against the Church, a
plan was devised by which Satolli would come to the United States under
the pretext of representing the Pope at the 1892 Columbian Exposition in
Chicago.[22] The Church’s reasons
for sending a delegate to the U.S. had more to do with its desire to
have in place a representative to mediate the appeals of priests against
their bishops and settle problems over parochial schools than to have
diplomatic relations with the United States government. Despite
continuing controversy over Satolli’s presence in the U.S. (most of the
criticism coming from the American hierarchy itself), he remained for
some four years. Relations were further strained during World War I when
Cardinal James Gibbons of Baltimore, representing the American
hierarchy, struggled to promote peace in Europe all the while clashing
with the administration of President Woodrow Wilson, a reserved man with
sharp anti-Catholic tendencies.
In 1929 the Holy See and Italy signed the Lateran Treaty, effectively
guaranteeing the sovereignty of the Vatican City State and the
international personality of the Holy See. According to the treaty,
"Italy recognizes full possession and exclusive and absolute power and
sovereign jurisdiction of the Holy See over the Vatican, as at present
constituted," a geographic area of 108.7 acres. The treaty also affirmed
the international personality of the Holy See and its right to enter
into relations with other states. The Lateran Treaty did not immediately
affect U.S.—Holy See relations but had important consequences for the
future establishment of formal ties.
By the middle of the 1930s, the U.S. depression era, domestic issues
of mutual concern to both the Catholic Church and the Roosevelt
administration brought the powerful members of the government and Church
hierarchies into a state of increasing collaboration. President
Roosevelt’s crusade against unemployment, unfair labor practices,
discrimination, and poverty were problems that the American Catholic
hierarchy was also attempting to tackle with equal vigor. It was a
relationship Roosevelt was more than happy to encourage.
Roosevelt found a devoted friend and supporter in the powerful George
Cardinal Mundelein, Archbishop of Chicago and a zealous social reformer.
Roosevelt’s first 100 days in office were marked by the successful
implementation of recovery programs designed to combat the Great
Depression. Within months of Roosevelt’s sweeping acts of executive
authority, Cardinal Mundelein wrote the president praising his
"remarkable record of achievement."[23]
This would prove to be the start of a long friendship between these two
iconographic men.
As Roosevelt continued to enact his "New Deal" social programs, he
won support from prominent prelates throughout the American Church, but
also gained harsh and vocal critics among the clergy. A priest in the
Diocese of Detroit named Charles Coughlin became a constant thorn in
Roosevelt’s side. Coughlin was an early supporter of Roosevelt, who
turned against him for what he perceived to be a failure of New Deal
reforms. The criticism ultimately turned into paranoia as Coughlin
repeatedly lambasted Roosevelt on his popular weekly radio program.
Coughlin’s radio show boasted the largest syndication in the nation with
nearly a third of the nation tuning in. He accused Roosevelt of
Communist sympathies and denounced the government in tirades of
anti-Semitism. Partly because of conflicts within the U.S. Catholic
hierarchy, and partly because of Coughlin’s wild popularity, the
American Church had a difficult time controlling the radio-priest.
Meanwhile Coughlin was eroding Roosevelt’s political popularity.
Undeterred, Roosevelt pushed ahead with his New Deal reforms. The
Catholic historian Gerald Fogarty has noted: "The similarity between
Catholic social teaching and New Deal legislation forged one of the
closest associations between the Church and the government since the
days of Ireland and Gibbons in the 1890s."[24]
The association found renewed energy in rising Catholic leaders like
Francis Spellman, auxiliary bishop of Boston from 1932, and later
Cardinal Archbishop of New York. In fact it was Spellman himself who
coordinated the visit of Cardinal Secretary of State Eugenio Pacelli to
the U.S. in the fall of 1936.
Spellman had grown to be a friend and protégé of Pacelli while
serving a tour in Rome during the later half of the 1920s. Not
surprisingly, it was Spellman, with the assistance of Joseph Kennedy,
who arranged a meeting between Pacelli and Roosevelt at the end of the
cardinal’s month-long tour of the nation. The two men met at the
president’s mother’s home in Hyde Park, New York on November 6, the day
after President Roosevelt’s reelection. Both men were figures of
pronounced charisma and were reputed to have enjoyed each other’s
company immensely.
We can only imagine that the topic of relations between their two
countries came up more than once over the course of Pacelli’s stay. John
Cornwell even suggests in a 1999 book on Pius XII that the two men
reached "an unspoken quid pro quo" agreement to establish formal
relations.[25] Cornwell claims
that Roosevelt wanted Father Coughlin silenced in return for renewed
diplomatic relations. Pacelli, in turn, is alleged to have desired
diplomatic relations with the U.S. as an assurance of U.S. friendship in
the face of Soviet encroachments into Eastern Europe.[26]
While sources indicate that the subject of Coughlin did come up among
senior prelates during Pacelli’s visit to the U.S., the notion that any
quid pro quo agreement was made with diplomatic implications appear to
be unfounded. Rather, the meeting between Pacelli and Roosevelt likely
planted seeds of friendship and trust that would mature as Europe
entered into war, with Pacelli assuming the Papacy.
Ultimately, Roosevelt’s affable relations with the leaders of the
American hierarchy along with his growing trust in Pacelli combined to
make diplomatic relations with the Holy See a viable, sensible, and
attractive proposition. As German and Italian aggression began to mount
in Europe, Roosevelt maintained a position of neutrality in an attempt
to keep the U.S. out of war. His principal objective was a restoration
of world peace, an end to which the Holy See was fully committed. Just
as mutual interest in domestic issues of social welfare brought
Roosevelt closer to the American Church hierarchy, a growing mutual
concern for peace and European stability also drew him into closer
liaison with the Holy See.[27] His
already well-established friendship with American prelates having strong
ties to Rome made the new relationship that much more efficacious.
Nevertheless, the growing awareness of humanitarian atrocities
occurring in Europe soon made it clear that the U.S. would have to take
a greater role in European affairs if peace was to be achieved. Both
Roosevelt and the Holy See became increasingly interested in
establishing diplomatic relations as a way to improve the flow of
information between America and Europe and, more importantly, as a way
to coordinate and strengthen relief programs for the victims of war-torn
Europe.
When Pope Pius XI died in February, 1939, Cardinal Pacelli was
elected to succeed him, taking the name Pius XII. Pacelli’s coronation
took place on March 12, and President Roosevelt sent as his personal
representative United States Ambassador to the United Kingdom Joseph
Kennedy. This high-profile representative may very well have been a
means to test public opinion towards diplomatic relations with the Holy
See. Soon after Pius XII’s coronation, Bishop Spellman of Boston was
promoted to the Archdiocese of New York, a post of international
visibility and prestige. Because of Spellman’s close ties to Roosevelt
and closer ties to Pius XII, he would become a critical instrument of
communication between the United States government and the Holy See. His
appointment was an unambiguous indication of the Vatican’s desire to
increase dialogue with the Roosevelt administration.
By the summer of 1939, interest in renewing diplomatic relations with
the Holy See was rising among some members of the U.S. political
establishment. In July, Secretary of State Cordell Hull received a
letter from Congressman Emanuel Celler, a Jewish representative from New
York City, arguing for the restoration of diplomatic ties to the Holy
See. In his letter Celler points out: "Events abroad indicate in no
uncertain terms the great stake which religion must play in the
preservation of democracy against the savage and merciless inroads of
Fascism, Nazism and Communism." In a dramatic plea he insisted: "A
reinstatement of relations with the Holy See would dramatically serve to
recall to the world that intolerance and religious hatred and bigotry
cannot flourish here. It would enkindle in our own hearts sympathy for
the thousands of unfortunates who have been castigated, tortured, and
ruined because of a dictator’s insane hate and venom." The letter goes
on to praise the Holy See for always placing "a high value on justice
and charity in relations among men and among nations." In particular,
Celler applauds Pius XII and his efforts to comfort war-torn Europe,
concluding, "Let us help him in his glorious mission of Peace by sending
our delegate to him."[28]
It appears the letter prompted discussion within the State Department
for on August 1, Under Secretary of State Sumner Wells sent a letter to
President Roosevelt saying that he and Secretary Hull had discussed the
"advantage which might be gained by this Government [of the United
States] if we had direct diplomatic relations with the Vatican." Welles
continued, "I think it is unquestionable that the Vatican has many
sources of information, particularly with regard to what is actually
going on in Germany, Italy, and Spain, which we do not possess."[29]
Welles goes on to imply that the State Department would be well advised
to pursue this information through diplomatic channels. In addition,
Welles forwarded to Roosevelt a copy of Representative Celler’s letter
in favor of restoring relations.
The idea of sending a representative to the Vatican began to gain
ground, prompting Roosevelt to invite Archbishop Spellman to lunch on
October 24 at the White House to discuss Vatican relations.
Nevertheless, Roosevelt recognized that sending an ambassador to the
Holy See was still controversial and would inevitably arouse opposition.
He explained to Spellman that a mission to the Holy See would have to be
humanitarian in character if it was to avoid controversy and political
opposition. Roosevelt also expressed his desire to send not an
ambassador, but a "personal representative," avoiding the problem of
Senate confirmation. And since a special representative would be unpaid,
the appointment would not conflict with the appropriations bill of 1867.
Spellman eagerly relayed Roosevelt’s message to the Cardinal
Secretary of State Luigi Maglione. Apostolic Delegate to the U.S.,
Archbishop Amleto Cicognani responded, "The Holy Father has learned of
the report with pleasure and hopes that Your Excellency as well as I
will make opportune overtures to the President, that he may carry out
his proposal."[30] Spellman
believed that Cicognani’s letter was supportive but not emphatic enough.
Spellman, in an act of considerable bravado, rewrote the letter and
delivered it to Roosevelt. The letter read, "The Holy Father received
with great satisfaction the information that the President desires to
appoint a mission to the Holy See to assist in the solution of the
refugee problem and to treat other matters of mutual interest…The Holy
Father directs Your Excellency to convey to President Roosevelt an
expression of deepest appreciation on his part and to say that he
believes and prays that the resumption of relations between the United
States and the Holy See will be most propitious, especially at the
present time when both are making parallel endeavors for peace, the
alleviation of sufferings, and other charitable and humanitarian
purposes. You are further requested to represent to President Roosevelt
that in the opinion of the Holy Father the proximate fulfillment of his
gracious intention will be most conducive to the welfare of a world
sadly torn by misunderstanding, malice and strife."
Sensing the time was right, the President moved quickly to appoint a
special representative. On Christmas Eve, 1939 President Roosevelt sent
a Christmas greeting to the Holy See sharing his hopes for peace and
announcing the appointment of Myron C. Taylor as personal representative
of the President to the Holy See. Pius XII received the news with
pleasure. That evening the Pope announced the appointment to the Sacred
College saying, "This news could not have made us more happy…"[31]
Myron Taylor was a logical choice for the job. His Protestant faith
mitigated any religious conflict of interest. He was also a prominent
former chairman of US Steel Corporation with extensive professional and
personal family ties to Italy.
For health reasons, Taylor delayed his trip to Rome until February of
1940. Before he left there was a controversy over the exact title and
rank he would take with him. Twice Taylor had contacted the State
Department complaining that his letter of appointment from the President
contained no mention of his status as "ambassador" and that he "attached
considerable importance to the mention of this."[32]
The commission was soon changed to include the words "with rank of
ambassador." Thus it was as special representative of the President of
the United States to the Holy See with rank of ambassador that Taylor
went off to Rome in February of 1940. But it was with the full ceremony
reserved to an ambassador with which Taylor was received by the Vatican.
In a letter to Roosevelt just after the arrival of Taylor, Pius XII
writes, "We confess to have been sensibly affected as We beheld before
Us your own Representative come upon a noble mission of peace and
healing…"[33] Taylor found himself
in a challenging diplomatic environment. Prior to his departure, the
President had charged him with a number of duties. Most dealt with the
continuing effort to establish peace in Europe, others dealt with
refugee problems and the care for prisoners of war. But Roosevelt also
had religious objectives for the mission. Presidential meddling in
religious affairs is something of a taboo and has been carefully avoided
in all relations with the Holy See past and present. Nevertheless,
Roosevelt had asked Taylor to seek Vatican support for the censorship of
Father Coughlin. Moreover, Roosevelt went so far as to ask Taylor to
convey his endorsement of Auxiliary Bishop Bernard Sheil of Chicago to
fill the vacant see of Washington D.C. The Vatican apparently agreed to
look into the matter of Coughlin but summarily dismissed Roosevelt’s
notion that the President of the United States should have any input in
the promotion of bishops.
Over the ensuing months Taylor served as a crucial intermediary
between the President and the Pope as the U.S. fought unsuccessfully to
keep Italy from entering the war. True to the humanitarian face
Roosevelt had initially placed on the mission, Taylor worked closely
with the Vatican to feed refugees streaming across the borders of
Europe, provide material aid to the victims of war-torn Eastern Europe,
and assist Allied prisoners of war. The mission became a clearinghouse
for thousands of letters from American families eager for news that
their loved ones were alive and well. But in less than a year after
taking office, Taylor’s health deteriorated and he was compelled to
return home.
While Taylor was regaining his health back in the States, the Vatican
was still facing a political crisis with the imminent entry of Italy
into the war. By April of 1941, Taylor had been away from his post for
nearly six months. Letters suggest that even from the United States,
Taylor continued to stay abreast of developments abroad. In April,
French Ambassador, Wladimir Ormeston wrote Taylor lamenting the
suffering endured by the French people and beseeching Taylor to do what
he could to encourage Roosevelt to intervene in Europe. He says one of
France’s greatest fears is that "the American people will not decide to
get into in the war in reality until the war is lost." He goes on to
say, "I have difficulty in understanding, I must confess, how the United
States, which went into the 1917 war from such honorable motives, should
still hesitate to make its maximum effort in this war…I assure you that
it is not an idle phrase to say that civilization is at stake."[34]
In order to preserve regular diplomatic contact with the Holy See
during Taylor’s absence, the State department appointed Harold H.
Tittman, a counselor at the U.S. Embassy in Rome to act as Assistant to
the Personal Representative of the President of the United States to His
Holiness the Pope. Tittman had been the de facto State Department
observer of Vatican affairs since arriving in Rome as a secretary at the
embassy to Italy and had acted as an assistant to Taylor in an informal
capacity since Taylor’s appointment in 1940. Now he was to play a
leading role in managing the United States’ ever more serious interests
at the Holy See.
On December 11, 1941 Italy and Germany declared war on the United
States. By this time Taylor was rested and ready to return to Italy, but
with the US at war with Italy it was nearly impossible to get Taylor
into the country. In a letter to the State Department President
Roosevelt wrote, "I agree that it would be very useful for Myron Taylor
to go back to the Vatican for two or three weeks. But how can we get him
there?"[35] Tittman, meanwhile was
still inside Italy keeping account of Vatican affairs. He and his family
had fled to the interior confines of Vatican City where other diplomats
accredited to the Holy See had already taken refuge. Tittman, however,
was not accredited to the Holy See but merely the assistant to the
representative of the President. The Holy See worried that providing
asylum to Tittman, an unaccredited American, would be a provocation in
the eyes of Mussolini’s government, which at any moment could discard
the sovereignty promised the Holy See. According to Gerald Fogarty, "On
December 16, Welles wrote Roosevelt noting that Hull supported the
suggestion that Tittman be named Chargé d’Affaires because ‘it is of
very great importance that Tittman remain in the Vatican City so that we
may continue contact through him with the Holy See.’"[36]
Finally, in September of 1942, the U.S. was able to secure Myron
Taylor safe passage back to Italy for a brief visit at the Holy See.
Taylor reiterated America’s commitment to win complete victory over the
Axis powers—a goal that did not correspond to the Holy See’s repeated
calls for immediate cessation of hostilities. In a letter to the
President, Taylor reported that he spoke "absolutely to convince the
Pope and the Vatican authorities that we would prosecute the war until
Hitler and Nazism were destroyed or made harmless."[37]
Secretary Hull discussed his concern for the Vatican’s conciliatory
tendencies in a memorandum to Taylor just prior to Taylor’s audience
with the Pope. He wrote: "While in London…you may wish to ascertain what
the reaction of the Foreign Office has been to the recent rumors that
the Vatican will be used by the Axis in the near future to support peace
proposals."
Taylor returned to the States at the end of September as diplomatic
troubles were beginning to escalate with the imminent Allied bombing of
Rome. Much of northern Italy had already endured heavy Allied bombing in
an effort to rout out Nazis and the Holy See was desperately trying to
broker an amnesty for the Eternal City. For obvious reasons they were
concerned about the welfare and safety of the Roman people, not to
mention the safety of artistically and spiritually significant Roman
Churches. In a letter to Archbishop Spellman, ultimately directed
towards President Roosevelt, Enrico Galeazzi, a layman and long-time
confidant of Pius XII, warned that an American bombing of Rome would
"provoke a harmful reaction in the entire Catholic world." He went on to
say, "Without prejudicing the efficient execution of his political and
military plans, the President of the United States should not neglect
the opportunity of imposing on the Allied Command a more generous war
conduct with regard to the Italian people, who have always nurtured
cordial feelings of friendship for the American people, especially
because the air attacks as presently directed, do not result in
substantially important advantages and perhaps serve only to redirect
these trends of friendship and to create in Italy an heroic climate of
desperate resistance."[38] These
pleas and passive threats went unheeded as Allied forces dropped bombs
on Rome—doing less damage than had been expected, eventually liberating
the city from the Nazi’s insidious grip.
On June 4, 1944 Allied forces entered Rome. As Americans were
storming the beaches of Normandy, Harold Tittman and his fellow
diplomats were finally able to step outside the Vatican after months of
asylum. But troubles were not over for the Church, or the United States.
With the fall of Nazism, another equally ominous force was gaining
dominion over the East. Communism had posed a threat to the Holy See
even before the rise of Hitler. According to a memo written in 1941 by
Myron Taylor about a conversation he had had with Archbishop Tardini,
then Secretary of the Congregation for Extraordinary Ecclesiastical
Affairs. Tardini said, "At present Europe is faced with two great
dangers: Nazism and Communism. Both are opposed to religion, to
Christian civilization, to personal liberty, to peace." Tardini told
Taylor, "If the war now in progress were to mean the end of both
dangers, a period of tranquility would be possible for Europe. If even
one of these evils—Communism, for example—were to remain an active
force, Europe would, within a few years, be in a situation identical
with that in which it finds itself today. In fact, Communism, once
victorious, would find no further resistance in Continental Europe…In
consequence, within the space of a few years there would be an enormous
Communist bloc, whose inevitable destiny it would be to provoke war with
England and America." Tardini went on to say: "It is well to bear in
mind…that Communism cannot renounce its struggle against religion and
Christian civilization because it has as its fundamental principle that
Capitalism must be destroyed and that religion is but the opium with
which Capitalism has drugged the proletariat."[39]
Tardini did not know how prescient his words would be. It would take
many years before the United States, in concert, with renewed and
strengthened diplomatic ties to the Holy See, would finally free the
world and the Church from the yoke of communist oppression. But the
partnership between President Reagan and Pope John Paul II was still far
off in the future. In April of 1945 President Franklin Roosevelt passed
away. For the next few years, Myron Taylor continued in his mission,
making occasional trips to the Holy See to discuss matters of political
and humanitarian significance.
In America, meanwhile, anti-Catholic sentiments had resurfaced, and
the Holy See was increasingly upset that Taylor was still not a fully
accredited diplomat to the Holy See. Despite the great role Taylor had
played in the diplomacy of World War II, capricious public opinion soon
mounted against his mission. After many years of distinguished service,
Myron Taylor was aging and deserving of the rest his retirement many
years before should have afforded him. He therefor submitted his
resignation as Personal Representative of the President of the United
States of America to His Holiness the Pope on January 18, 1950.
Myron Taylor left an indelible mark on the history of our relations
with the Holy See, steering our nation’s diplomacy through the turbulent
years of World War II. Together with Harold Tittman’s invaluable
day-to-day contributions to the work of the mission, it cannot be
overstated that Taylor’s friendships and diplomatic ties extended across
borders and beyond the political realm of the Holy See, making him in
many ways America’s ambassador-at-large for the cause of peace in
Europe.
Even Mr. Taylor had a conscious awareness of his historical purpose,
which is evident in the care he took to maintain the immaculate files
that are our greatest source for information on the U.S. mission to the
Pope during the war years. Mr. Taylor had all of his papers, letters,
and important documents bound in volumes and sent to Libraries and
archives all over the United States. There are letters within the
volumes that almost shamelessly deal with the production of the
historical files themselves. At a time when America was engaged in heavy
fighting in the Pacific theater, and at a time when German troops were
rounding their way through Northern Africa, Myron Taylor sent the
following letter to Grace Tully, the President’s secretary: "Among the
various papers which I delivered to the President was a personal letter
to him of which he said he would send me a copy for my confidential
file. I realize that the pressure of matters may have caused this,
contrary to the usual custom, to have escaped his attention, I ask you,
without making too much of a point of it, to send me a copy of that
letter."[40] Needless to say,
keeping Myron Taylor’s correspondence file up to date was likely not a
priority of the President at that time. But ultimately we are indebted
to Taylor, not just for his diplomacy during those trying years, but
also exactly because of his meticulousness, for he has given us an
invaluable glimpse into this important epoch of our past.
President Truman wished to continue friendly relations with the Pope
and in October of 1951 appointed General Mark W. Clark to represent the
United States at the Holy See. Truman intended General Clark to act not
merely as his special representative to the Holy See, but as an
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary. Truman felt that direct
diplomatic relations with the Vatican would "assist in coordinating the
effort to combat the Communist menace."[41]
Within a day of the President’s announcement, letters and telegrams came
pouring into the White House. Truman himself in a letter to an Episcopal
supporter wrote, "There is no doubt that the issue is a controversial
one."[42] Truman had support from
many such as Rev. Robert Kevin, a seminary professor who wrote, "Dear
Mr. President: Although I am a Protestant and a real one…I congratulate
you on the appointment of General Mark W. Clark as Ambassador to the
Vatican State."[43]
Historian Arthur Schlesinger Jr. wrote in The Atlantic Monthly
in 1952, "The fuss over the appointment continues to seem a spectacular
case of much ado about nothing." He went on to say, "The Vatican is
constantly in [the] process of making political decisions. These
decisions influence great masses of people. It is the injunction of
elementary good sense that we should do what we can to make sure that
these decisions support rather than obstruct our own foreign policy."[44]
Earl Godwin, National Broadcast Company newscaster and friend of
President Truman, best expressed the sentiments of Truman’s supporters
when he wrote the President’s secretary saying, "I have supported the
President’s position on this matter of an ambassador to the Vatican
although I am a Protestant and a Mason…However, I think it might be wise
for some of us who are supporting the President’s views to be instructed
as to some of the reasons for this ambassadorship. All of the
information I get is on the other side."[45]
Indeed, most of the mail received expressed vitriol and indignation
for the appointment, or as Truman put it, the letters contained "more
heat than light."[46] Letters,
especially from the American Baptist community, described the
appointment as a "threat to our freedom" and "disruptive to our national
life." One angry minister charged that Clark’s appointment would result
in "a possible split of the country." On the whole, the letters of
protest were overly dramatic and apocalyptic. The poorly conceived
arguments tended to rest on the belief that appointing an ambassador to
the Holy See was a violation of the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution. The catch phrase used by the opponents to the appointment
was "separation of church and state."
What many of the opponents failed to recognize was that first of all,
the constitution does not call for the unconditional non-interaction
between the state and religious organizations. Instead, the constitution
decrees that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion." An ambassador to the Holy See does not establish the Catholic
faith as the state religion. Secondly, the Holy See is not simply a
religious body, as the critics argued, but also a sovereign state under
international law capable of sending and receiving ambassadors and
entering into treaties.
Ultimately, however, Truman could not ignore the protests of the
opposition. The critical response was overwhelming. The White House
received 1,069 letters against the Clark appointment and only 186
letters in favor.[47] In January
of 1952 Clark withdrew his nomination and Truman chose not to attempt
another appointment. Schlesinger, who would later be Special Assistant
to President John Kennedy, wrote scathingly of Truman’s decision saying,
"When any President begins to flinch from making wise decisions because
they will enrage a section of the population, he might as well resign."[48]
Some have speculated that Truman intended the nomination to fail, and
was simply looking to keep a personal promise to Pius XII that at the
end of the war he would appoint an ambassador to the Holy See. Knowing
that establishing relations with the Holy See would be a political
disaster, it is possible that Truman picked Mark Clark, a man who was
unpopular with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and who is said
to not even have wanted the job, so that the nomination would fail. In
this way, long-term political controversy would be minimized while
keeping his promise to Pius XII. Regardless of Truman’s intent, the
nomination failed. It failed in such a grand fashion that President
Dwight Eisenhower did not even attempt to touch the issue of diplomatic
relations with the Holy See, even as the U.S. entered into the most
frigid days of the Cold War, when the Holy See would have been a staunch
and valuable ally.
While non-involvement with the Holy See appeared to be the policy of
the U.S. government, it would be misleading to say that cooperation
among the Holy See, the American hierarchy, and the American foreign
policy establishment had come to an end. In fact, over the course of the
ensuing years, Cardinal Spellman, who in 1946 was made a cardinal,
worked closely with Vatican and State Department officials to counter
Communism in America and Europe. For example, the American hierarchy and
the Vatican worked with the State Department to help forestall Communist
victory in the Italian elections of 1948, 1953, and 1958.[49]
With the presidential candidacy of Senator John F. Kennedy, the issue
of U.S. – Vatican relations again came to the forefront of public
debate. Kennedy came from a prominent Catholic family and his father,
Joseph Kennedy, was a friend of Spellman and President Roosevelt’s first
diplomatic agent to the Holy See. He was chosen to represent the United
States at the coronation of Pius XII in 1939. In later years, the
politically powerful Joseph Kennedy, along with the outspoken Cardinal
Spellman, were two of the most adamant champions of the American push to
establish stronger relations with the Holy See. For political reasons,
however, son John Kennedy opposed U.S. recognition of the Holy See.
As the first Catholic President of the United States, Kennedy had to
tread carefully. At the time of his candidacy, many Americans feared
that if elected, Kennedy would takes his orders from the Pope. Kennedy
allayed these fears in 1960 when he spoke before the Greater Houston
Ministerial Association. In his address he said, "I believe in an
America where the separation of church and state is absolute—where no
Catholic prelate would tell the President (should he be Catholic) how to
act…where no church or church school is granted any public funds or
political preference….where no public official either requests or
accepts instructions on public policy from the Pope…where no religious
body seeks to impose its will directly or indirectly upon the general
populace or the public acts of its officials." He went on to ask that he
be judged not on the basis of propaganda, but on his behavior in
Congress, giving as an example his "declared stands against an
Ambassador to the Vatican."[50]
Kennedy’s rejection of diplomatic relations with the Holy See was
unambiguous, and this position likely played a part in winning him the
presidential election the following November.
Once in office, the opinion of the Kennedy Administration towards a
relationship with the Holy See was more complex than Kennedy’s electoral
rhetoric would suggest. Kennedy’s tenure in office coincided with a
watershed moment in Church history—the Second Vatican Ecumenical council
of 1962, also known as Vatican II. While the administration continued to
publicly distance itself from any ties to the church, the events of
Vatican II had deep resonance within United States. The intersecting
strains of optimism and modernization inherent in both Kennedy’s "New
Frontier" and the Church’s Second Vatican Council were hard to ignore.
One of the first Church-related decisions Kennedy had to make was
whether to send a personal representative to the celebration of Pope
John XXIII’s birthday and third anniversary of his coronation in June of
1961. State Department officer, Melvin Manfull wrote to Ralph Dungan,
Special Assistant to the President offering his advice, "In line with
[the Unites States’] policy of non-recognition, the U.S. Government
addresses itself to the Papacy as the symbol of religious authority
rather than the depository of temporal sovereignty." Consequently,
Manfull concluded that "the appointment of a Personal Representative or
Representatives to represent the President at the forthcoming
celebration of Pope John’s birthday and third anniversary of his
coronation would be quite appropriate from the point of view of United
States foreign relations and would be quite consistent with previous
United States practice."[51]
Among those in the administration who appeared to be sympathetic to
relations with the Holy See was Arthur Schlesinger Jr., who, as we have
already seen, previously favored sending a representative to the
Vatican. Nevertheless, throughout the Kennedy administration, cables
from the White House to the American Embassy in Rome always refer to the
Holy See as if it was strictly a religious organization. After the
United States decided not to send a representative to the opening
ceremonies of the Ecumenical Council of 1962, Vatican Diplomat,
Monsignor Igino Cardinale went to the U.S. Embassy to Italy imploring
the U.S. to reconsider, and insisting that the U.S. would be making a
horrible mistake. The Embassy paraphrased Cardinale’s arguments in a
cable sent back to Washington. According to the pithy and abbreviated
language of the cable, Cardinale said "ECUMENICAL COUNCIL IS BEING
CONVENED NOT IN NAME OF ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH BUT BY HOLY SEE WHICH IS
INTERNATIONAL PERSON (JURIDICALLY), NOT SOLELY RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATION…US
HAS ALREADY SENT SPECIAL DELEGATION TO HOLY SEE ON AT LEAST THREE
SIMILAR BUT FAR LESS SIGNIFICANT OCCASIONS."
He went on to say, "REACTION TO FAILURE OF US TO ATTEND CEREMONIES
WOULD BE HIGHLY CRITICAL IN CATHOLIC COUNTRIES…US WOULD IN EYES OF MANY
OF THESE COUNTRIES BE PUTTING ITSELF IN SAME BOAT WITH USSR…IF HOLY SEE
‘SO MUCH AS DROPPED HINT THAT RUSSIAN OFFICIAL ATTENDANCE WOULD BE
WELCOMED, KRUSHCHEV HIMSELF WOULD BE ON THE NEXT PLANE.’"[52]
Despite Cardinale’s threats and pleas, the U.S. still did not send a
representative to the opening ceremonies of Vatican II. The Council was
disbanded after the death of John XXIII in 1963. But a memo from Dungan
to the President dated June 22, 1963, prior to the President’s trip to
Rome and just after the election of Pope Paul VI suggests that despite
the administration’s conspicuous rejection of everything Catholic,
behind the scenes the administration continued to follow the affairs of
the Holy See. In the memo, Dungan wrote, "It seems to me that the
election of Paul VI with his strong intellectual and diplomatic
background will make it more fruitful for us to have closer and
completely informal relations with him. As you know, up to the present
time we do have a direct and very informal relationship with Msgr.
Cardinale who was close to John XXIII. This, however, is not
satisfactory in terms of any detailed substantive conversations."
This memo is revealing for a number of reasons. It is an indication
that relations with the Holy See, however informal, did exist in the
Kennedy administration. Moreover, Dungan suggests that these relations
should be strengthened. Most startling is what Dungan wrote next. He
speculated that the Apostolic Delegate to the U.S., Archbishop Egidio
Vagnozzi, would be replaced by Paul VI and that "it would be most
helpful to Rome and to the United States if a relatively young and
progressive person were appointed Apostolic Delegate to the United
States."[53] With guarded words,
Dungan suggested that, if given an opportunity in Rome, Kennedy should
employ whatever subtle tactics necessary to influence the selection of
the next Apostolic Delegate to the United States. We do not know
Kennedy’s response to this memo. Regardless, the memo is far removed
from Kennedy’s pointed call for the separation of church and state
before the Houston ministers conference back in 1960.
Kennedy’s behavior on the subsequent trip to Rome was anything but
indicative of a desire to renew relations with the Holy See. Kennedy did
meet with Paul VI, but it was reported in the July 15, 1963 issue of
U.S. News and World Report that "he did not kneel and kiss the
Pope’s ring, as Catholics normally do at such meetings. Instead he bowed
and shook hands."[54] We will
never know what path Kennedy’s relations with the Holy See would have
taken for he was assassinated the following November.
President Lyndon Johnson continued Kennedy’s policy of shunning
diplomatic ties to the Holy See. It was not until the Presidency of
Richard Nixon that the United States elevated relations with the Holy
See to a level comparable to that under Roosevelt. On June 5, 1970
Richard Nixon appointed Henry Cabot Lodge special envoy to the Holy See.
Lodge was a former U.S. Senator who had served as U.S. Ambassador to the
United Nations and vice-presidential running mate in Nixon’s
unsuccessful 1960 campaign. Nixon said in his announcement, "I have
asked Henry Cabot Lodge to visit the Vatican from time to time."[55]
Lodge wrote in an informal memorandum after assuming his post, "I was
provided with a foreign service officer as assistant, a secretary, and
office space. It was agreed – in fact the Vatican stipulated – that my
mission would be completely separate from the Embassy. It was also
decided that the staff would be on duty throughout the year. I was
provided with an apartment at the Grand Hotel whenever I was in Rome. It
was agreed that my wife would come with me and that my expenses would be
paid. I do not, however, receive a salary."[56]
After six years in service, to both Richard Nixon and his successor,
Gerald Ford, Mr. Lodge was able to boast of many bilateral
accomplishments. He wrote, "We worked with our U.S. diplomatic missions
in Zaire, Burundi, and Uganda to help bring about the liberation of
Bishops arrested in African countries. We worked on ratification by the
Vatican of a treaty which seeks to prevent the proliferation of nuclear
weapons…We have worked with the Vatican in extending economic and social
aid in certain underdeveloped countries…We have worked to carry out, and
explain to the Vatican…our U.S. government attempts to curb the
international drug traffic…The Catholic News Service reports that thanks
at least in part to Vatican intervention, mail to prisoners of the Hanoi
government rose from a trickle of letters a year to more than 150
letters every two months during the last years of the war. Finally,
during many conversations at the Vatican, I acquired information on such
far-reaching questions as problems of the Middle East, the SALT talks,
the status of Jerusalem, European security and the religious problems in
Poland and Czechoslovakia." Lodge concludes, "I believe this
relationship has definitely been in our national interest."[57]
With the election of Jimmy Carter in 1976, Lodge’s fruitful career in
Rome came to an end. Carter continued the legacy left by Lodge,
appointing David Walters, a Miami attorney and a Catholic, to be his
special envoy to the Pope. Paul VI died in 1978, which was followed by
the resignation of Walters. Before Carter had time to appoint a new
representative, John Paul I was elected Pope, and died unexpectedly
within a month. In October, John Paul II was elected to the See of Rome,
and Carter appointed former mayor of New York City, Robert Wagner to be
his representative to the new pope.
In 1981 under President Ronald Reagan relations would finally start
moving to maturity. The early 1980s were a time of nascent but
revolutionary change across Europe. Within three years of Reagan taking
office, the U.S. would have a full-fledged ambassador representing
American interests at the Holy See. Within ten years, the back of Soviet
Communism would be broken. Reagan recognized the critical role the Holy
See would be able to play in a final assault on the forces of Communism
in Eastern Europe and he saw Pope John Paul II as a friend and ally.
Both men saw Communism as a threat to freedom, peace and opportunity
worldwide. John Paul II, a native of Poland, knew first-hand the
suffering and challenge to established religion that persisted under
communist regimes. Sympathetic to the suffering and oppression of
millions living in Eastern Bloc nations, the Holy See was of the utmost
strategic importance to the President. Reagan felt it was imperative
that he have a representative at the Holy See who he could trust. For
this reason he appointed William Wilson, a California real estate
developer and long time personal friend as his representative to the
Holy See.
The early years of the relations between the Reagan administration
and the Holy See progressed with rapid intensity as John Paul and Reagan
became keenly aware that Poland, the most populous of the Soviet
Satellites, was also one of the most politically vulnerable. Reagan and
John Paul believed that if they could collaborate to bring down the
communist regime in Poland, the rest of Eastern Europe might follow.
According to former National Security Advisor William Clark, Reagan and
John Paul shared "a unity of spiritual view and a unity of vision on the
Soviet empire: that right or correctness would ultimately prevail in the
divine plan."[58]
The West put its hopes for dissolution of Polish communism in the
fledgling but immensely popular Solidarity labor movement. A declaration
of martial law had driven the Solidarity movement underground in
December of 1981. In June of 1982, the Pope and President Reagan met
privately for the first time at the Vatican and committed themselves to
supporting Solidarity.[59] Over
the next several years, the U.S. and the Holy See began smuggling fax
machines, printing presses, radios, television transceivers, and
propaganda materials into Poland. According to journalist Carl
Bernstein, "Lech Walesa and other leaders of Solidarity received
strategic advice—often conveyed by priests or American and European
labor experts working undercover in Poland."[60]
Agents from the CIA, the AFL-CIO labor union, and the Catholic Church
worked in clandestine company in order to assist and fuel Solidarity in
their opposition movement. Slowly, and with unwavering assistance from
the U.S. and the Holy See, Solidarity began to erode the fragile power
base of the Communist regime in Poland. Victory over Polish Communism
would not be achieved until 1990, but even by 1983, Reagan was seeing
the results of his close collaboration with the Holy See. Certainly the
notion of upgrading relations with the Vatican would have crossed his
mind.
To be sure, it was an idea that occurred to Wilson as early as
December 1982, when he contacted the White House asking what steps would
have to be taken to establish full diplomatic relations. Wilson, who was
living in Rome, was eager to see relations normalized and his position
as representative elevated to that of ambassador. As Wilson once put it,
"When you fully realize that you are representing the President of the
most important country in the world—politically, economically, and
militarily—to the head of state of the most important entity in the
world from a spiritual and moral standpoint, you begin to realize that
you are in a very important position. When you’re in that position and
you are not an ambassador, you tend to wonder why." Apparently it was a
question the Vatican was asking itself as well. Wilson has said that
while serving as Representative of the President, the Vatican treated
him "royally, as though they were anxious for the U.S. to become an
embassy."[61]
In 1982 the Holy See made a clear expression of interest in formal
relations with the United States. The Knights of Columbus were planning
their centennial anniversary when Wilson received a call from Vatican
Secretary of State Cardinal Casaroli inviting the President to attend
the festivities in Connecticut. Wilson conveyed the invitation to
Reagan, who subsequently accepted. At the centennial Cardinal Casaroli
had a private hour-long meeting with Reagan, and Ambassador Wilson
speculates that this meeting provided the impetus for Reagan’s decision
to establish formal relations with the Holy See. Weeks after this
meeting, Wilson was chatting with the President in a private room just
off the Oval Office, as was customary between the two friends, when
according to Wilson, Reagan said, "I realize the importance of having
diplomatic relations with the Vatican and I’ve got to find a couple of
senators and a couple congressmen to support this." Wilson was confident
that Reagan would find the support he needed because "in those days, if
Reagan wanted something, he usually got it because he kept pushing until
he figured out how to do it."[62]
Reagan’s two strongest congressional supporters on this particular
initiative were Clement Zablocki, a Democrat Congressman from Wisconsin,
and Richard Lugar, a Republican Senator from Indiana. On June 30, 1983,
the Catholic Zablocki introduced a resolution in the House of
Representatives calling for "the establishment of United States
diplomatic relations with the Vatican." The resolution cited the
historical precedent for relations with the Holy See in addition to a
belief that such relations would "strengthen mutual efforts to advance
the cause of world peace."[63]
Technically, the resolution intended to permit appropriations for a
new embassy by amending the 1867 congressional spending bill that cut
funding to the original U.S. legation to the Vatican. In July 1983,
Senator Lugar, a Methodist, introduced in the Senate a bill identical to
Zablocki’s. Lugar said at the time, "The Vatican is a sensitive focus of
international relations. It is also a sovereign state, and with John
Paul’s courage and character, a powerful force for decency in the
world."[64]
On September 22, 1983, the Lugar Bill passed the Senate by a
unanimous vote. While the bill did not actually establish an embassy per
se—a power reserved to the President—it passed with none of the
rancorous, emotionally charged religious debate that characterized the
Mark Clark appointment 40 years previously. In fact, the Congressional
Record reveals that there were laudatory remarks from lawmakers on both
sides of the Senate aisle. While public opposition to the bill had been
minimal, some church groups with a political presence in Washington had
expressed early disapproval for the bill, but by and large, because the
Lugar Bill was simply an appropriations amendment, it failed to catch
the attention of mainstream America. On January 10, 1984, however,
President Reagan announced the nomination of Wilson as the first
Ambassador to the Holy See; the American public took notice, and the
reaction was mixed.
The Washington Post called the announcement "a sensible
and long overdue move," while at the same time criticizing the speed
with which Lugar’s Bill was shuttled through Congress.[65]
The Indianapolis Star, Senator Lugar’s hometown paper, commented, "The
ban on funding a diplomatic mission to the Vatican was a shabby remnant
of religious prejudice. Repealing it…was good riddance to bad feeling
directed in large measure against the waves of Irish Catholic immigrants
who had fled their homeland during the famine of the mid 1840s."[66]
According to a Gallup poll from early 1984—a popular measure of American
public opinion—57 percent of the American population approved of
Reagan’s decision to upgrade the status of his mission to the Pope to
that of an embassy. According to the poll, "While Catholics supported
the move by 79-11 percent, Protestants gave it a strong 48-29 percent
approval."[67]
Despite positive polling numbers, opposition to the President’s
decision was formidable. The Editorial Board of The New York Times
passed off Reagan’s announcement as a shortsighted pander to Catholic
voters.[68] Yet there was concern,
even within the American Catholic Church, that U.S. relations with the
Holy See might present a conflict for the separation of church and
state. The Catholic magazine America suggested that "there are
some reasons for thinking that such a move would be far more helpful to
the State Department than to the Catholic Church in the United States."
The editorial went on to say, "There is also the possibility that a U.S.
Ambassador to the Vatican might attempt to influence decisions that
would affect the internal life of the Catholic Church in the United
States." American Catholic bishops and clergy had traditionally relished
a certain degree of independence from Rome. The American hierarchy had
always sought to avoid administrative strictures like permanent
apostolic delegates, so to some, formal relations with the Holy See were
a cause for concern.
By far the most outspoken critics were Protestant religious groups.
Jerry Falwell, a fundamentalist preacher and former leader of the now
defunct Moral Majority, lambasted Reagan’s decision to send an
ambassador to the Vatican saying, "A bad precedent is being set. I
wonder when Mecca will want one [an ambassador]. I told the White House
if they give one to the Pope, I may ask for one."[69]
James Dunn, executive director of the Baptist Joint Committee on Public
Affairs, denounced Reagan’s decision as "a dumb, bungling move by an
Administration that doesn’t seem to understand the first lesson about
church-state relations."[70]
Mounting criticism for Reagan’s decision found an outlet at Wilson’s
Senate confirmation hearing. Throughout the hearing, Wilson’s personal
character and professional qualifications were never brought into
question. Nevertheless, critics used the podium to once again reiterate
their opposition to sending an ambassador to the Holy See. Senator
Charles Percy reminded the packed conference room that "the issue of
whether or not the President has the authority to name an ambassador to
the Holy See has been settled in Congress." Senator Lugar addressed
critics saying, "In many ways, the Vatican is a far more significant and
wide-ranging actor than many of the other governments with which we
maintain formal relations."[71]
Ultimately, Wilson was confirmed in the Senate by a vote of 81-13.
Wilson was well received at the Vatican, where upon presenting his
credentials John Paul said, "On this occasion I cannot fail to express
my conviction that the condition of today’s world depends in great
measure on the way the United States exercises her global mission of
service to humanity."[72]
Wilson noticed a dramatic change in U.S.-Vatican relations after the
elevation of the U.S. mission to that of an Embassy. "Previously,"
Wilson said, "they knew that I wasn’t getting full cooperation out of
the United States and out of the State Department when I was not an
ambassador. And it made a little bit of a difference. As a matter of
fact, it made quite a bit of difference." According to Wilson, "There
were more open doors and more people wanting to see me."[73]
Back in the United States, opposition to the embassy continued among
sectors of the population. In September of 1984, Americans United for
Separation of Church and State, in partnership with the American Baptist
Churches in the U.S.A., the National Evangelicals, the National
Association of Laity, and other religious and lay organizations filed a
joint suit in Federal Court naming Wilson and Reagan as defendants. The
plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of sending an Ambassador to
what they perceived to be nothing more than the Roman Catholic Church.
The court dismissed the case on a number of grounds. The court found
that the plaintiffs could not demonstrate "injury-in-fact" as a
consequence of diplomatic relations with the Holy See and thus lacked
standing to sue. In other words, while the plaintiffs successfully
argued that the separation of church and state was a good idea, a point
that was never in dispute, they failed to show how this particular
diplomatic mission constituted an entanglement of church and state
leading to the establishment or preferential treatment of a single
denomination. The court observed, furthermore, that all of the
plaintiffs’ arguments were premised on the presupposition that the Holy
See is not a sovereign entity but simply a religious organization, a
"nonjusticiable political question" on which the plaintiffs had no
constitutional authority. Ultimately, the Court upheld the
constitutional right of the President to decide with whom the United
States has diplomatic relations.[74]
After a fierce challenge, the U.S. Embassy to the Holy See was
finally secured. Soon after the first ever U.S. Ambassador, Bill Wilson,
was in place in Rome, he found himself facilitating visits between the
Pope and General Vernon Walters, who was shuttling to Rome as President
Reagan’s personal representative to the Holy Father. General Walters
later reminisced that he developed a special rapport with the Pope
because he could speak to him in Polish as he briefed him using
satellite photography showing the Russian military build-up in Warsaw
Pact countries. The Pope’s ensuing support for U.S. efforts to stem the
Soviet tide and "end the evil empire" were manifest, and soon Reagan
made good on a U.S. commitment to put intermediate range missiles into
Western Europe. Thus developed a symbiosis between Pope John Paul II and
Ronald Reagan that would within a few short years bring an end to Soviet
communism. Ronald Reagan recognized the critical role the Holy See would
be able to play in eliminating the forces of communism in Eastern Europe
and he saw Pope John Paul II as a friend and an ally. The Pope knew
firsthand the threat of communism to life and liberty and President
Reagan had great sympathy for the suffering of millions living in
Eastern Bloc nations and he moved quickly to develop this strategic
alliance with the Pope, aided by Ambassador Wilson. This alliance would
continue under President George Bush, with the help of Ambassador Tom
Melady, finally bringing down the Iron Curtain in 1989. If one was ever
needed, this victory was the ultimate justification for the Reagan-led
notion of having full diplomatic relations with the Holy See.
In 1986, Ambassador Wilson, citing a desire to return to private
life, along with a belief that "what had to be done [at the Vatican,
namely establishing full relations] has been done," resigned his post
and returned to his beloved California.[75]
President Reagan appointed Frank Shakespeare to replace Wilson in
September 1986, heralding the continuity of truly normalized relations
with the Holy See. Shakespeare was a former ambassador to Portugal,
media executive, and Director of Radio Free Europe. He was a soviet
expert and a steady hand at the tiller, helping to nurture a healthy
rapport in the new relationship with the Holy See. In concert with the
Pope, Shakespeare effectively continued the fight against global
communism.
With the administration of President George H.W. Bush came a new
Ambassador to the Holy See, Thomas Melady, former educator and
Ambassador to Uganda and Burundi. The Senate confirmed Melady in August
1989 and his tenure spanned a dynamic period of world unrest.
Not long after Melady arrived at his post, Soviet President Mikhail
Gorbachev came to Rome to meet with the Pope. The evolving relationship
between this progressive leader of the Soviet Union and John Paul II was
of keen interest to the United States. Over the previous few years
Gorbachev had been promoting his glasnost and expanding his
program of liberal reforms. The Bush administration and the State
Department, wary after 40 years of Cold War, wanted to know whether
Gorbachev could be trusted. In a meeting with Cardinal Casaroli, Melady
was told that the Pope strongly believed Gorbachev’s liberal sentiments
were sincere. Melady has written that this information formed a
foundation for President Bush’s policy towards the Soviet leader.
A few months later, in December, Melady was faced with a diplomatic
crisis when Panamanian dictator Manuel Noriega sought to avoid arrest by
the U.S. and his countrymen by seeking asylum in the Panama City
nunciature of the Holy See. The United States wanted to try Noriega for
trading illegal narcotics, and for days there was a standoff outside the
nunciature as U.S. Army troops set up an armed camp around the perimeter
of the building. Through deft diplomacy, Melady and other U.S. officials
working with the Vatican were able to negotiate Noriega’s voluntary
surrender to U.S. authorities.
The conflict in Panama was soon overshadowed by the 1990 Gulf War in
Iraq. Melady was in the difficult position of justifying the war against
Iraq to a pope who believed that Kuwait should be liberated through
diplomatic dialogue and not through the use of force.[76]
While the Holy See disagreed with the wartime policy of the Bush
Administration, they had nothing but the highest respect for Bush’s
character, and they were sorry to see him go.
Bush’s successor, President Bill Clinton, appointed former mayor of
Boston, Raymond Flynn to be Ambassador to the Holy See. Ambassador Flynn
worked to build stronger ties between government and the private sector.
Through Ambassador Flynn’s many trips to African and Asian countries
ravaged by disease and natural disaster he directed international
attention to places where the Church, corporate America, and non-profit
relief organizations could work hand-in-hand to help those in need.
Despite Flynn’s best efforts, the Clinton Administration’s relations
with the Holy See were often fraught with tension. The two governments
clashed most noticeably during the U.N. Conference for Population and
Development held in Cairo in 1994. The Clinton Administration supported
Cairo proposals calling for universal access to "pregnancy termination,"
a position the Holy See, not to mention Flynn, vehemently opposed. John
Paul II launched an intensive political campaign to oppose the Cairo
proposal, which he condemned for promoting "a society of things and not
of persons." According to Ambassador Flynn, "John Paul II’s campaign
against the Cairo proposals prompted the U.S. government to intensify
its own campaign in support of the plan."[77]
In addition to crossed views over right-to-life issues, U.S.-Holy See
relations for much of Flynn’s tenure were marred by international
press-coverage of President Clinton’s personal moral indiscretions.
By 1996, Flynn felt he had worked honorably to reconcile his values
with those of the Clinton Administration and done what good there was to
do at the Holy See. After an unusually long four and a half years in
service, Flynn resigned his post and returned to Boston.
In 1997 Clinton nominated Corrine "Lindy" Boggs of Louisiana to be
the fifth U.S. Ambassador to the Holy See. Lindy Boggs, had served nine
terms in the U.S. House of Representatives, having succeeded her
husband, Congressman Hale Boggs, who disappeared in an airplane crash in
1972. At the age of 82 she brought with her to Rome a lifetime of
informal diplomatic experience. In Washington she was known for her
magnetic Southern charm. She had no known enemies and unending scores of
admirers from every end of the political spectrum. Her popularity
followed her to the Vatican, where she was loved for her graciousness
and warm-hearted humor. These attributes proved to be essential as she
strove to represent Bill Clinton to the Pope. While at the Holy See,
Boggs worked extensively to promote worldwide religious freedom and
religious tolerance on behalf of the Clinton Administration. With genial
dexterity she raised awareness at the White House of the Holy See’s
continued hopes for nuclear disarmament and third-word debt relief.
During her stay in Rome Boggs also found time to actively promote
environmental reform and she became an outspoken leader in the worldwide
fight against trafficking in human beings, a cause the U.S. Embassy
continues to actively pursue.
Boggs' tenure culminated in the spectacular Jubilee festivities of
2000 when millions of pilgrims descended upon Rome. She was diplomatic
hostess to a never-ending marathon of parties, dinners, celebrations,
and ceremonies. She handled her responsibilities with the sort of
finesse and efficiency that only someone with experience organizing two
presidential inaugural balls, a national bicentennial celebration, and a
lifetime of Washington dinner parties could.
While Ambassador Boggs was preparing to say goodbye to the Holy See,
the newly elected George W. Bush was working hard to assemble his
administration back in Washington. Early in 2001, after several
discussions with the new President and Vice President of the United
States, President Bush called me at my office in Washington and said,
"Jim, do you still want to go to the Vatican?" I said, "Yes sir!" He
said, "I want you to go to the Vatican," and thus began the process that
led to my being sworn in as the sixth U.S. Ambassador to the Holy See on
August 10, 2002. My wife and I were off to Rome shortly thereafter, and
were enjoying the breathtaking monuments of Roman antiquity, as we
started our courtesy calls on members of the Curia and fellow diplomats,
when suddenly the United States and the world were plunged into the
shock of September 11, 2002. It was while paying a courtesy visit on the
French Ambassador that we were informed of the World Trade Center
attack. I knew then that the world and this mission would be a far
different place.
Two days later I met with the Pope at Castel Gondolfo for about
twenty minutes as part of my accreditation procedure, and the events of
September 11th dominated our conversation. I took time to
explain to the Pope my country’s need to respond to the terrorists in
our own self-defense, and in defense of our friends. After much
discussion and even a prayer together, the Pope responded by saying that
he believed that the events of September 11th were indeed an
attack not just on the U.S., but "on all mankind", and we were justified
to take defensive action. He asked me only to appeal for him to
President Bush that the U.S. adhere to the high standards of justice for
which our country had become known. I assured him that I would, and
President Bush has done so.
It was at this meeting that the stage was set for the Holy See’s
support of our counter-terror campaign. It is extraordinary that the
Pope and the Church are supporting us, and equally noteworthy that this
support continues as we strive to find those behind the September 11th
attacks and bring them to justice. Having the moral support of the Holy
See in a Combatine context has been very valuable to President Bush as
he leads the coalition of nations united in this "war on terrorism."
The Vatican, which did not support the U.S. in the Gulf War, nor in
trade sanctions against Iraq or Cuba, is a stand-up moral supporter in
Afghanistan. Having the good offices and staff of our Embassy here in
Rome, with daily, sometimes hourly contact with the leaders and
diplomats of the Vatican, whether it be on issues of terrorism, Middle
East peace, religious freedom, human rights, hunger, or human
trafficking, has proven itself invaluable to the U.S. as our government
works to make the people of the world safe, fed and hopeful.
The diplomatic relations that began in the late 18th
century have been marked with highs, lows, and hiatus right up to today,
when the level of diplomatic encounters has never been higher. For
example, President George W. Bush has had two private meetings with the
Holy Father in the past ten months. But things were different in 1779,
and it has been a long road to where we are now. When I think about the
history of United States relations with the Holy See, I can not help
feel that I am part of something—a legacy, a relationship that continues
to be vital to the hopes for a peaceful world where men, regardless of
their religion, will someday accept each other and live accordingly. Few
will dispute the collaborative role that President Reagan and Pope John
Paul II played in bringing down the Iron Curtain and freeing Europe and
the world of the scourge of Communism. Few will dispute the role that
President George W. Bush and the Pope, who have already met twice, can
play in trying to diminish the growing polarity in the world due to
religious intolerance and extremism. It is the leader of the strongest
temporal power in the world teamed closely with one of the great moral
leaders of the world, in a common goal of helping others to accept
cultural and religious traditions that differ from their own.
The value of having this harmonious and full diplomatic relationship
in today’s world is palpable. Having the responsibility of being the
President’s interlocutor to the Pope in this context is both daunting
and humbling. It is also a rare privilege which I cherish.
I firmly believe, as have my predecessors going back to 1779, that
the Holy See has an international presence like none other. Whether a
collection of Papal States in central Italy with an army or, whether 109
acres of sovereign land with a global following of over one billion
people, the Holy See is a partner with us in the quest for freedom,
justice, peace, and human dignity throughout the world. Being full
diplomatic partners really helps.
Introduction to the 2004 Second Edition of
“The United States and The Holy See: The Long Road”
As we celebrate the 20 th anniversary of the establishment of formal
diplomatic relations between the United States of America and the Holy
See, I am pleased to add to my book on the subject published by 30
Giorni in 2002. These later chapters encompass our relationship from the
aftermath of the events of September 11, 2001, through the Iraq War, and
concluding with the Pope’s 25 th Anniversary in October 2003. The true
test of a strong relationship between nation-states is whether it
withstands tension and disagreement. The Iraq War provided such a test
for the United States and the Holy See, although it was a test due more
to disagreement over means than ends. Having weathered that test, our
dialogue on how we can work together to better serve all of God’s
children remains close, cordial, and dynamic.
* * *
From the beginning of my ambassadorship, it was evident that the
relationship between the United States and the Holy See would be one of
mutual cooperation that would bear much fruit because of our shared
values. The National Security Strategy of the United States states
clearly that the first goal of American international engagement today
is to "stand firmly for the nonnegotiable demands of human dignity, the
rule of law, limits on the absolute power of the state, free speech,
freedom of worship, equal justice, respect for women, religious and
ethnic tolerance and respect for private property.” This goal is also at
the core of the Holy See’s vigorous and extensive international
engagement. That is why, in my first two years as ambassador, we worked
together closely to promote the dignity of human life by combating the
horrors of human trafficking, overcoming hunger and malnutrition,
increasing humanitarian aid and relief, and promoting democracy, human
rights, religious freedom and tolerance.
Post 9-11: A Voice Against Violence in the Name of Religion
When the United States was attacked on September 11, 2001, our
country was confronted with a security crisis different than any we had
ever faced before. Unlike Pearl Harbor -- an unprovoked military
aggression by one country against another -- the terrorist attacks left
us pursuing a shadowy enemy operating in many nation-states capable of
striking U.S. interests at home or abroad. President Bush recognized
that this enemy could only be defeated with the broadest possible
international support, and set about building a coalition of 174
countries determined to oppose terror. In this coalition, the support of
the Holy See greatly strengthened the moral foundation of this global
effort to defeat terrorism.
I presented my diplomatic credentials to the Holy Father at his
summer palace at Castel Gandolfo on September 13, 2001 – just 48 hours
after the events in New York, Washington D.C., and Pennsylvania. The
Pope told me that he had thought and prayed about this tragic day and
concluded that, “this was an attack not just on the United States, but
against all of mankind.” He implied that the U.S. would have to take
steps to protect itself and asked only that President Bush maintain the
strong sense of justice for which our country had become so well
respected. Building on the Pope's recognition that the September 11
attacks would justify a response, the Holy See's Secretary for Relations
with States, then-Archbishop Jean-Louis Tauran, gave public backing to
U.S. actions to track down the perpetrators when he affirmed in an
October 2001 interview that “t oday we all recognize that the United
States government, like any other government, has the right to
legitimate defense, because it has the mission to guarantee the security
of its citizens."
Beyond recognizing the U.S. right to self-defense, the Holy See also
intensified its own initiatives to counter terrorism by speaking out
against any violence in the name of God, and by promoting
inter-religious dialogue and understanding as a counter-weight to those
who sought to provoke a violent clash of civilizations and religions. In
January 2002, the Pope gathered over 200 religious leaders in the
ancient city of Assisi, as he had done twice before, to lead
representatives of world religions in a Prayer for Peace. At this time,
the Pope exclaimed:"War never again! Terrorism never again! In the name
of God, may every religion bring upon earth justice and peace,
forgiveness and life, love!"
On the first anniversary of the September 11 attacks, I was able to
greet the Pope after his general audience where he prayed for the
victims of the September 11 terrorist attacks, and to thank him for his
support and prayers. To prevent future terrorist attacks, he called on
the international community "to undertake new political and economic
initiatives capable of resolving the scandalous situations of injustice
and oppression.”
The Challenge of Iraq: Justifying War to a Man of Peace
As the fight against global terrorism proceeded and we learned more
about terrorist efforts to obtain weapons of mass destruction, the
United States increasingly began to focus attention towards states with
a track record of development and use of weapons of mass destruction.
Saddam Hussein's Iraq, which had demonstrated its brutal disregard for
its own citizens by a willingness to use biological and chemical weapons
against neighbors and Iraqis alike, and which had maintained long-term
connections with Hezbollah and other international terrorist networks,
quickly moved to the forefront of U.S. concerns.
Reflecting this priority, my staff and I began to outline U.S.
concerns about Iraq to Vatican officials in the late summer of 2002,
highlighting Iraq’s 12-year defiance of United Nations resolutions, its
failure to account for weapons of mass destruction, and its continued
internal repression and human rights abuses. We found that Vatican
officials shared our concerns about Saddam Hussein’s regime and our
desire to prevent the spread of nuclear, chemical and biological
weapons. In fact, senior officials went out of their way to counter what
they regarded as a misleading public impression that the Holy See was
sympathetic towards Iraq. This impression was a product of the Vatican’s
previous opposition to the 1991 Gulf War, its persistent calls for the
end of United Nations sanctions on Iraq, and its apparent public
reluctance to address continuing Iraqi human rights abuses. In fact, the
Holy See’s caution toward Iraq reflected its preoccupation with the fate
of the approximately half-million Chaldean Catholics living in Iraq and
a desire not to provoke any government reaction against them. While I
appreciated this concern, I also knew that the Holy See was respected
worldwide as a voice for human rights and I believed that Iraq’s abuses
needed to be held up to international scrutiny. We therefore continued
to make our case on Iraq privately, emphasizing the importance of human
rights, the positive impact of the UN’s Oil for Food program for the
Iraqi people, and the risks to regional and international security posed
by this evil regime.
Another factor that may have contributed to this impression of
caution toward Iraq was the Holy See’s broader desire for dialogue and
cooperation with Islam and with the Muslim world to ease religious
tensions that foment violence. Clear public support for President Bush's
Iraq goals could have created a perception that the Vatican was at odds
with Islam and could have reinforced and equated in the eyes of many
Muslims perceptions of an alliance between the Western World and
Christianity.
Under this Pontificate, the Holy See has made great strides in
building bridges and promoting inter-religious dialogue. Pope John Paul
II has expressed respect for Islam and has articulated a vision of
openness, respect and a desire for reciprocity in his dealings with the
Muslim world. The Holy See has also sought opportunities to find common
ground and cooperate with Islamic countries, especially in international
organizations, where they sometimes share similar objectives, as during
the United Nation’s 1994 Conference on Population and Development in
Cairo, where joined together in opposition to worldwide access to
abortion and other population control policies. I believe t he Holy
See's initiatives and ecumenical efforts to reduce tensions between
Christians and Muslims have helped prevent new divisions from being
created and have great potential to continue breaking down walls of
misunderstanding in the future.
As the U.S. spotlight on Saddam Hussein intensified in late summer
2002, a public debate emerged over whether the United States should seek
a renewed UN mandate for any military action that might be necessary to
compel Iraq’s compliance to UN Security Council Resolutions. Both
privately and publicly, the Holy See conveyed its view that any recourse
to force should occur with United Nations authorization. In fact, the
Vatican’s foreign minister, Archbishop Tauran, in a September 9
interview with Italian Catholic newspaper L’Avvenire,
reinforced the Vatican's view of the centrality of the UN's role:
“Should the international community . . . conclude the use of force is
opportune and justified, this should only happen with a decision made in
the framework of the United Nations.”
Although the United States did not believe that such a decision could
only be made within the UN framework, we clearly believed that decisions
taken with strong UN support would strengthen the international
community's hand in its effort to ensure Iraqi disarmament. To achieve
such a consensus, President Bush appeared before the United Nations on
September 12 and called on the UN to live up to its ideals and ensure
its demands were respected. Far from ignoring the UN, the President was
seeking to restore its authority in the face of a regime that had
consistently ignored it. Following nearly two months of debate, the
Security Council unanimously passed resolution 1441 on November 8, 2002
-- a resolution reflecting the united will of the international
community to ensure Iraq’s compliance with UN disarmament resolutions
and giving Iraq one final chance to comply or face serious consequences
– in UN-speak: military force. This was a resounding vote, and included
even that of Syria, affirming that Saddam Hussein's proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles posed a threat to
world peace.
The Holy See welcomed the recourse to the UN represented by
resolution 1441 and the unity demonstrated by the international
community. It also acknowledged to us that in the absence of the threat
of military force, Saddam almost certainly would not have allowed
inspectors to resume their work following the resolution’s passage.
During the previous 12 years, Saddam Hussein had defied 16 previous
Security Council resolutions. Furthermore, since Iraq invaded Kuwait,
the UNSC had passed close to 60 resolutions requiring that the Iraqi
regime comply with UN demands. In the absence of serious consequences
for non-compliance, however, his only punishment had been further
admonition and continued economic sanctions.
Despite the recognition of Saddam Hussein’s defiance of international
law and the danger that he posed, concern about the possibility of war
in Iraq was widespread within Vatican circles, and often found its way
into Vatican or other international media. Some of the concern was
measured, such as from Cardinals who said they saw “neither motive nor
proof” to justify military action until the inspection process had an
opportunity to proceed further, and who suggested that war “would do
great harm in the region.” Other views, particularly from Vatican
sources who criticized alleged “ U.S. unilateralism” and spoke of a
“spirit of crusade,” were less guarded and contributed to an impression
within the media of growing division between the U.S. and the Holy See.
Part of my job was to help overcome what seemed to be a high level of
suspicion over the power and influence of the US and its alleged 'lust
for oil.' Th is feeling, held by many in Europe, was that America, being
the world's leading capitalist country, must have some profit motive in
Iraq. The media’s efforts to portray the United States and Holy See as
fundamentally at opposite spectrums of the war debate continued to
intensify – with one Italian Catholic magazine even commissioning a poll
asking respondents whether they were “with President Bush for war, or
with the Pope for peace.” Notwithstanding such efforts, our positions
were never as far apart as the media portrayed. Both the Pope and
President Bush believed that war should be the last resort. Both
recognized the danger posed by Iraq and called for Iraq to disarm. Both
recognized that decisions on war and peace must be made by legitimate
civil authorities. The difference we had essentially came down to the
question of whether all diplomatic means to achieve Iraqi disarmament
had been exhausted short of resort to military action. The United States
believed after 12 years of Iraqi defiance in the face of a strong UN
consensus that Iraq would never willingly comply with the UN. The Holy
See continued to believe that inspections and dialogue offered a means
to meet the international community's concerns -- a view the Pope
conveyed to President Bush in a late October correspondence.
The Just War: the key role of Saint Augustine
As we headed into the New Year, this difference in approach over how
to achieve Iraqi disarmament and promote regional security gave rise to
an international debate about when military action was appropriate to
achieve desired international ends. As the repository of the “just war”
tradition dating back to St. Augustine, the Holy See increasingly found
itself at the center of the global debate about the Iraq war. In his
traditional address to the 174 nations of the Vatican diplomatic corps
at the start of the New Year, the Pope outlined his approach to Iraq.
Beginning with a firm "No to War," the Pope continued: "War is not
always inevitable. It is always a defeat for humanity!” Although his
opposition to war was strong, the Pope also added that “war cannot be
decided upon, even when it is a matter of ensuring the common good,
except as the very last option and in accordance with very strict
conditions” -- a view the United States shared. The Holy See appealed to
the world to be certain that the three well-established criteria of the
just war tradition were met: that war be fought in self-defense or
defense of others, that the use of force have a reasonable likelihood of
success, and that all other non-violent means be exhausted. The Pope's
message, reinforced in my private Vatican meetings, was that the
international community should pursue all means short of war possible to
achieve its agreed goal of Iraqi disarmament, but that the Church's
doctrine did not exclude the legitimacy of the use of force under
clearly defined criteria and after all alternatives were exhausted.
President Bush made clear that he sought to abide by the precepts of a
just war; however, in the end, the Holy See and the U.S. disagreed on
the facts of whether all non-violent means had been first exhausted, and
whether the threat of Saddam countenanced more time for talk and
inspections.
Unfortunately, the subtleties of the Pope's message were lost on much
of the public, particularly in Europe, where his "No to War" was seized
on by protesters as an absolute "no" rather than a qualified "no." In
Rome, I recognized that we needed to broaden the public debate to
encourage more focus on the nature of today's terrorist and WMD threats
and the responses morally appropriate to defend innocent populations
from these new threats. We decided to stimulate some new thinking
regarding these threats and reactions by inviting to Rome the noted
American academic and Catholic intellectual Michael Novak to speak about
Iraq in the context of the Just War theory. Novak's early February visit
was intended to broaden the just war debate and clarify the just nature
of United States policy in Iraq.
In the highly charged atmosphere of the time, with millions taking to
the streets of European capitals, including Rome, to protest, the media
seized on the visit, mistakenly portraying it as a last-ditch U.S.
effort to convince the Pope to support the war. This misunderstanding
prompted some American religious leaders to write me, opposing
Ambassador Novak's visit, asserting that he was a “dissident theologian”
whose support for a “preemptive” military strike against Iraq was at
odds with the church’s teachings on what constitutes just war. Contrary
to the media's portrayal and the reaction it generated, Michael Novak
came to Rome as a private citizen presenting his own views on
traditional just war theories and today's new threats, not on a mission
for the United States government.
Novak's presentation and meetings with Holy See officials did in fact
offer a needed perspective on the issue of when military action could be
justified. His February 10 lecture at Rome's Center for American
Studies, entitled: "Asymmetrical Warfare and Just War," spoke directly
to the new challenges confronting our leaders in a world where
international terrorists operating without connections to states
threaten innocent people with catastrophic results. Novak eloquently
made clear that traditional theories needed to be updated to take into
account the speed and devastation of modern threats and the inability of
governments to wait until after such an attack to respond. Taking on
critics of "preventive war" -- he also pointed out that military action
against Iraq should more appropriately be seen as the “lawful conclusion
to the just war fought and swiftly won in January 1991,” whose ceasefire
terms Saddam Hussein had violated with impunity.
Throughout this period, the Pope spoke out repeatedly and carefully
in favor of dialogue and a peaceful means to end the tension,
reiterating that war should always be the last resort. I fully
appreciated the Pope's message. He is a man of peace -- perhaps the
world's greatest voice for peace -- but he is not a pacifist. His
Secretary of State, Cardinal Angelo Sodano, frequently emphasized this
fact during his public discussions of the Holy See's position. In fact,
the Pope’s position was fully in line with traditional Catholic
teachings on just war, which make clear that there are circumstances in
which “evil must be confronted to defend the innocent and to promote the
minimum conditions of international order.” In fact, throughout this
period, the Pope himself never took sides or condemned military action
as immoral. His plea, consistent with the traditional role of the Holy
See in international affairs, was to remind the world of the horrors of
war and to encourage world leaders to resolve the threat through
dialogue and reconciliation in order to achieve a lasting peace. The
United States shared this goal, and continued to work through the United
Nations during this period to achieve Iraq's disarmament peacefully.
Diplomatic Station of the Cross: Cardinal Laghi's Mission to
President Bush
As debates over a second UN resolution intensified in New York, the
Vatican emerged as an international focal point for leaders on both
sides of the debate who were seeking to make their case to the Pope and
to secure his moral support for their hardening positions. Numerous
prime ministers and foreign ministers came through Rome to see the Pope,
prompting the New York Times to describe the Vatican as a "diplomatic
stations of the cross." In the space of two weeks, the Pope received
Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz, German Foreign Minister Joschka
Fisher, United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan, British Prime
Minister Tony Blair, and Spanish Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar. The
Pope’s visitors brought different perspectives to Vatican City, but
regardless of what side of the debate they represented, the Pope’s
message was clear and consistent: First, all parties have an obligation
to strive for peace and reconciliation. Second, all parties have a
responsibility to collaborate with the international community and
conform to justice, inspired by international law and ethical
principles. Finally, special attention and consideration must be given
to the humanitarian situation of the Iraqi people.
The Aziz visit presented an opportunity to convey to one of Saddam's
inner circle the determination of the international community to see
Iraq disarm. In a meeting I held with Archbishop Tauran prior to Aziz's
visit, it was clear to me that the Holy See intended to use the meeting
to send a clear message to Iraq on the importance of complying with UN
resolutions. In Aziz's subsequent meetings with the Pope and his senior
officials, the Holy See told him directly that time was running out for
Iraq and that it needed to make concrete commitments to disarm in order
to avert war. Unfortunately the Pope's message fell on deaf ears. The
blustering Aziz publicly threatened European countries in a post-meeting
press conference, asserting that “if the Christian countries of Europe
participate in a war of aggression, it will be interpreted as a crusade
against the Arab world and Islam. It will poison relations between the
Arab world and the Christian world.”
With the prospect of war looming ever larger because of the
unwillingness of key members of the Security Council to impose the
“serious consequences” called for in the unanimously approved Resolution
1441, the Holy See decided that it was time to make a final diplomatic
initiative. Rumors of an envoy to Washington had long been circulating
in the media, and the Pope's decision to send Cardinal Roger Etchegaray
to Iraq to meet with Saddam increased speculation of a mission to
Washington. Etchegaray's mission, seen by the Vatican as a last chance
to avert war by impressing upon Saddam the implications of his refusal
to cooperate, made little headway. Defiant and fatalistic, Saddam
offered little more in his February 15 meeting than Iraq's standard
assertions of its compliance and willingness to fight to the end.
Despite Saddam's intransigence, the Holy See believed that Iraqi
disarmament could be achieved through continued international pressure
on the regime short of war with intensified inspections.
To make this point directly to the President, the Pope decided to
dispatch Cardinal Pio Laghi as his Special Envoy to the President. I
strongly supported this meeting, believing it would afford the President
a chance both to outline the moral case for action in the event of Iraqi
defiance and to highlight the commonality of our goals for the region's
security. Cardinal Laghi, a former Nuncio to Washington and tennis
partner of the President's father, arrived in Washington the first week
in March carrying a letter from the Pope. I accompanied Cardinal Laghi
to the Oval Office where he delivered the Pope's message, which assured
the President of his prayers and urged him to "search for the way of a
stable peace." Laghi reinforced the Holy See's view that war should be
the last resort, and that any decision on military action needed to be
taken within the framework of the UN. The President eloquently outlined
his view of both the legality and morality of military action, noting
that the UN had already provided the needed framework for action with
Resolution 1441 and previous resolutions, and that his duty was to
protect the American people from the potential risks posed by Saddam's
regime.
In the end, neither side shifted its view on the need for military
force, but both found common ground on the need to overcome the
terrorist threat. Cardinal Laghi's mission, following the breakdown at
the United Nations arising from France's decision to oppose any further
resolutions on Iraq, did not change the Administration's approach.
Nevertheless, the President's willingness to meet at length with the
Vatican envoy reflected the importance he attaches to the Pope's views
and his desire -- reflected in his two meetings with the Pope -- to take
the Holy See's perspectives into account in U.S. foreign policy
decision-making. This would pay benefits in the aftermath of the war
when we were to collaborate closely on humanitarian relief and issues
relating to Iraqi reconstruction and development.
The War.
On March 19, after 12 years of waiting for Saddam Hussein to comply
with United Nations’ conditions imposed at the end of the 1991 Gulf War,
the President announced that U.S. forces were en route to liberate the
people of Iraq from Saddam Hussein. He defended his decision by
explaining: “We cannot defend America and our friends by hoping for the
best. History will judge harshly those who saw this coming danger but
failed to act. In the new world we have entered, the only path to peace
and security is the path of action.” Secretary Powell had phoned
Archbishop Tauran on March 17 to alert him that if Saddam did not
respond to the President's final plea to leave Iraq, military action
would follow. He assured him that the U.S. was mindful of the Pope's
concerns, and would do everything possible to minimize casualties and
alleviate suffering. Archbishop Tauran conveyed his appreciation for the
call, and stated, as he had publicly days before, that the decision on
whether all diplomatic means had been exhausted was one for civil
authorities to make, this being consistent with the Church’s doctrine on
just war.
Following his intensive personal efforts to avert war, the Pope
received the news of the outbreak of war, with “deep pain,” according to
his spokesman. The statement added that: “On the one hand, it is to be
regretted that the Iraqi government did not accept the resolutions of
the United Nations and the appeal of the Pope himself, as both asked
that the country disarm. On the other hand it is to be deplored that the
path of negotiations, according to international law, for a peaceful
solution of the Iraqi drama has been interrupted.” Other officials
expressed fears of "a blaze that could spread throughout the Middle East
sowing hate and enmity against Western society which is perceived as an
invader" and predicted "destruction, hatred and the development of a
grave crisis.”
While the United States and the Holy See ultimately disagreed on
whether all peaceful means had been exhausted prior to the decision to
go to war, the Holy See did ultimately accept that such decisions are
for legitimate civil authorities to make. Archbishop Tauran summarized
the Holy See's role best when he explained to Famiglia Cristiana,
that "the Holy See is a moral power, and must be the voice of
conscience. We recalled the supreme good of peace, the defense of life,
the defense of human rights, and above all, the need always to make
recourse to law. And then, at a certain point, the decision fell to
civil authorities. They must decide if the time for diplomacy has ended
and if the time to move on to force has arrived. It is their
responsibility and the conscience comes into play. We tried to enlighten
the conscience of those with responsibility."
On April 9, concurrent with a visit from Undersecretary of State John
Bolton, taken at the request of the White House, to begin to discuss
possibilities for post-war cooperation with the Holy See in Iraq,
Baghdad fell and Saddam's statues began to tumble. The Holy See
expressed its relief that casualties had been minimal, and issued a
statement April 10 calling the collapse of the Hussein regime as a
“significant opportunity for the population’s future.” Following the
discussion with Undersecretary Bolton, the Vatican emphasized its
determination to work with us on the post-war needs of the Iraqi people,
noting that "the Catholic Church is ready to lend the necessary
assistance through its social and charitable institutions.”
Kissinger and "Pacem in Terris"
With the first wave of military operations over and our attention
turning to the construction of a peaceful, democratic, and tolerant
Iraq, I reflected on my role as the representative of the American
people to the Holy See during this historic period. My responsibility,
and the responsibility of my colleagues in the diplomatic corps, is to
advance America's national interests by building international support
for actions we believe can create a stable world environment for
Americans and for others. To do this effectively, as Henry Kissinger has
pointed out, we need to build a moral consensus internationally by
making clear that America's interests and those of other countries can
best be advanced by working toward shared values of liberty, human
dignity, and peace. My efforts as Ambassador were aimed at forging a
moral consensus on Iraq. Even though the Holy See did not in the end
agree on the decision to resort to military action, they did share our
goals for international and regional security and an end to the
oppression of the Iraqi people. In the end, there was no doubt on either
side that conditions for true peace were absent in Saddam's Iraq.
It was significant that at the start of this tumultuous year in his
Message for the World Day of Peace, the Pope had recalled the framework
for peace first outlined by Pope John XXIII in “Pacem in Terris.” The
Pope identified four essential pillars of peace: truth, justice, love
and freedom. In the case of Iraq, none of these conditions existed.
Instead of love of others, Saddam used chemical weapons on his neighbors
and citizens. Instead of justice, we saw suppression of the Kurds, with
whole families lined up in front of pits in the ground and shot. Instead
of truth, we saw deception of the international community. Instead of
liberty, we saw oppression and fear. Hate, injustice, deception, and
fear – these are not true foundations for peace.
Managing the post-war period: Colin Powell visits the Vatican
Recognizing the absence of the foundations for peace, the question
the international community faced was how to create conditions to
establish these foundations for the future. This was the challenge
confronting President Bush and the rest of the free world. As a leading
voice for peace and security, the United States had to define a response
to the threat and the injustice embodied by the Hussein regime that
would achieve the foundation for the genuine peace we all seek.
President Bush listened carefully to the moral advice offered by
religious leaders in shaping his prudential judgment on how to respond
to the new threats we face in this era of senseless terrorism. The
President himself is a man of deep faith. At the National Prayer
Breakfast in February 2003, he outlined the source of his decision to
act: "We can be confident in America's cause in the world. Our nation is
dedicated to the equal and undeniable worth of every person. We don't
own the ideals of freedom and human dignity… But we do stand up for
those ideals, and we will defend them."
Throughout this period, the Holy See always acknowledged that the
pillars of peace were absent and that Saddam Hussein posed a threat to
his people and the region. In fact, Cardinal Laghi referred to the four
pillars of peace in his meeting with the President. Our discussions,
contrary to the media-driven perception of a "chill in relations" were
always shaped by this shared understanding of Iraq's shortcomings and
our common interest in a peaceful, disarmed and tolerant Iraq. As a
result, they were always friendly and focused on shared moral goals. As
Archbishop Tauran explained to a journalist during the peak of the
international debate when asked about discussions with the U.S.: "We are
having conversations, but they are calm and serene. I would say they are
persevering in making their argument." Moreover, contrary to perceptions
of anti-Americanism that arose during this time, I always found the Holy
See to be open to our views and appreciative of our efforts to advance
the values we share. As Archbishop Tauran told the Italian magazine
Famiglia Cristiana, the idea of an anti-American feeling within the
Holy See "doesn't correspond to reality." He added: "The American people
are a great people. There is a Catholic community involved in social and
cultural life, with works of charity. These are the values that the Pope
and the Holy See greatly appreciate."
Reflecting the continuing strength of the relationship and the
breadth of our shared interests in bringing hope to regions of the world
that have only known despair, Secretary Powell arrived in Rome in June
for an audience with the Pope and a meeting with his top officials,
Cardinal Sodano and Archbishop Tauran. In his meetings, Secretary Powell
discussed ways the U.S. and Holy See could collaborate to help the Iraqi
people, to promote religious freedom in Iraq and elsewhere, to advance
the Middle East peace process, to promote inter-religious dialogue and
understanding, to combat malnutrition and hunger through expanded use of
bio-tech foods, and to defeat the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Africa. The visit
reaffirmed publicly our private sense of a close, vibrant, and mutually
beneficial bilateral relationship that is helping to promote human
dignity worldwide.
The Moral Issue of Biotech Food
In fact, throughout this period relating to Iraq, I was having
separate and productive discussions with the Holy See on a moral issue,
a life issue dear to my heart -- that of feeding the hungry. From the
time I learned of the potential of biotech foods to ameliorate hunger
and starvation, I was determined to work with the Holy See to try to
bring its strong moral voice to this issue, just as it had recently done
on the issue of trafficking in human beings at a May 2002 conference on
this subject, which my Embassy organized with the Vatican's support.
The biotech food issue came to a head in the fall of 2002 when
American food aid provided through the World Food Program was rejected
by the Zambian government because it could have contained a small
percentage of biotech foods. A Jesuit priest was active in Zambia in
encouraging the government to take this stand, and he in turn had
influenced Zambian bishops, contributing to the confusion that put
millions of Zambians at risk. The World Food Summit held in Rome in June
2002, concluded that 800,000 people in the world are undernourished and
that a child dies every five seconds from starvation. Food, when needed
to sustain life, is clearly a moral issue, and thus, while acknowledging
that every state has the sovereign right to accept or reject commodity
assistance, the United States maintains that every state also has the
duty to ensure that their citizens have enough food to eat. In short, we
believe that food sustains life, and life is precious, and therefore
this is a moral issue, especially to advocates of a “culture of life”
such as the Vatican.
In light of the positive assessment of biotech foods by the Holy
See’s Pontifical Council for Science, I urged them to share their
results more broadly with bishops and nuncios to help overcome the
misinformation that had paralyzed the World Food Program's efforts in
Zambia. Secretary Powell also took up the case in an appeal to
Archbishop Tauran, and as a result, the Holy See agreed to share
information more widely with church leaders in affected areas.
Given the benefits for the developing world from biotechnology, we
believe that the Holy See’s moral voice on the safety of foods for
consumption and on the potential of such foods to overcome hunger and
malnutrition can help dispel myths about biotech foods throughout the
developing world. It can also discourage the propagation of
misinformation by Church leaders or affiliated groups that is currently
putting lives at risk. There are too many hungry people in the
world whose futures should not be held hostage to narrow political
agendas of well-fed people in developed countries. Significantly, in
November 2003, the Holy See convened an international conference,
“Genetically Modified Organisms, Threat or Hope? ” indicating a strong
interest to be better informed on this undeniably moral issue and a
willingness to examine the potential of such foods to ameliorate hunger
and malnutrition among the world's neediest people.
This is just one example of how the United States and the Holy See
continue to work closely together to improve lives around the world.
Whether protecting the sanctity of life, promoting human dignity,
championing religious freedom and liberty, bringing attention to the
trafficking of human beings or feeding the world’s hungry, the
fundamentally strong partnership between the United States and the Holy
See ensures that these common goals that shape our respective foreign
policies will continue to dominate the agenda for human dignity
worldwide.
The United States and the Holy See will continue to share the
international stage in the years ahead. Their voices will continue to
shape the international agenda as well. Although we will almost
certainly have differences over how best to achieve some goals we hold
in common, the primacy of human dignity will illuminate the long road
ahead of us. As we celebrate the 20th anniversary of our formal
diplomatic relationship, I am confident that our thoughtful dialogue
will continue to enhance the dignity of mankind, and will continue to
nurture the mutual goal that each person, regardless of race, color or
creed can live peacefully in a free society and realize their God-given
potential.
Celebrating 20 Years of Full Diplomatic Relations
And so, as we celebrate this 20 th Anniversary of our full diplomatic
relationship, we do well to reflect on the words of the Pope and
President Bush regarding the road traversed and the road ahead. The
Pope, addressing the President during his July 2001 visit to the
Vatican, observed: “ I am confident that under your leadership, your
nation will continue to draw on its heritage and resources to help build
a world in which each member of the human family can flourish and live
in a manner worthy of his or her innate dignity. I cordially invoke
upon the beloved American people, God's blessings of wisdom, strength
and peace. President Bush reciprocated his respect and esteem for Pope
John Paul II during his visit to Poland in May 2003. Speaking in Krakow,
the Pope's spiritual home town, President Bush commented: “ Through the
years of the Second World War…a young seminarian, Karol Wojtyla, saw the
swastika flag flying over the ramparts of Wawel Castle. He shared the
suffering of his people and was put into forced labor. From this
priest's experience and faith came a vision: that every person must be
treated with dignity, because every person is known and loved by God. In
time, this man's vision and this man's courage would bring fear to
tyrants and freedom to his beloved country, and liberation to half a
continent. To this very hour, Pope John Paul II speaks for the dignity
of every life and expresses the highest aspirations of the culture we
share.”
After 20 years as full diplomatic partners, this relationship between
these two great superpowers -- one temporal, one moral -- is maturing,
and, with their foundations of common values, will do well together to
bring peace and dignity to the world’s people. As the President’s
Ambassador to the Holy See and interlocutor with the Pope, it is a great
privilege to be part of this history and this opportunity.
ENDNOTES:
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Vatican files
- Sock, Leo F., ed. Consular Relations Between the United States
and the Papal States: Instructions and Despatches, Vol. II.
Washington, D.C.: Catholic University Press, 1933. Xxii.
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Consular Relations Between the United States and the Papal States:
Instructions and Despatches, Vol. II. Ed. L.F. Stock. Washington,
D.C.: Catholic University Press, 1933. 60.
- Cicognani , Felix. "Letter to Martin Van Buren, 21 February 1831."
Consular Relations Between the United States and the Papal States:
Instructions and Despatches, Vol. II. Ed. L.F. Stock. Washington,
D.C.: Catholic University Press, 1933. 33.
- Congressional Globe, "Message of the President," December
7, 1847.
- Congressional Globe, "Debate on the Mission to the Papal
States," March 21, 1848, 405
- Congressional Globe, "Debate on the Mission to the Papal
States," March 21, 1848, 404.
- Congressional Globe, "Debate on the Mission to the Papal
States," March 21, 1848, 408
- Congressional Globe, "Debate on the Mission to the Papal
States," March 21, 1848, 403.
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United States Ministers to the Papal States Volume I. Ed.
L.F. Stock. Washington, D.C.: Catholic University Press, 1933. 2.
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States Ministers to the Papal States Volume I. Ed. L.F.
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States Ministers to the Papal States, Volume I. Ed. L.F. Stock,
Washington, D.C: Catholic University Press, 1933. 239.
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United States Ministers to the Papal States, Volume I. Ed. L.F.
Stock. Washington, D.C.: Catholic University Press, 1933. 255, xxx.
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States Ministers to the Papal States, Volume I. Ed. L.F. Stock.
Washington, D.C.: Catholic University Press, 1933. 295.
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United States Ministers to the Papal States, Volume I. Ed.
L.F. Stock. Washington, D.C.: Catholic University Press, 1933. 421.
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States Ministers to the Papal States, Volume I. Ed. L.F.
Stock. Washington, D.C.: Catholic University Press, 1933. 427.
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- Stock, L.F., Consular Relations Between the United States and
the Papal States: Instructions and Despatches, Vol. II.
Washington, D.C.: Catholic University Press, 1933. xxxix.
- Fogarty 120
- Fogarty 243
- Fogarty 239
- Cornwell 176
- With the U.S. and USSR allied to fight Germany, the Holy See was
concerned that the U.S. might look the other way if the USSR plowed
through Eastern Europe, disrupting the Church’s operations and
hindering religious freedom.
- Fogarty 259
- Rep. Celler à Hull 7/24/39
- Welles à Roosevelt 8/1/39
- protocol no. 231/39, Cicognani to Spellman, Washington, November
28, 1939 supra Fogarty 261
- Blet 31
- note dept. of State, Div. of Eur Affairs 2/9/40
- Pope Pius XII à F.D.R. 3/16/40
- Wladimir Ormeston à Taylor 4/25/41
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290
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Library, 76-B Vatican Ambassador file
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The Atlantic Monthly. January 1952, p. 55-56
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Presidential Library, 76-B Vatican Ambassador file
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Library, 76-B Vatican Ambassador file
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General 1/20/51-12/31/61
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- Memorandum from H. C. Lodge to The President, Dec. 28, 1972,
Embassy Vatican files
- Embassy Vatican files
- Report from Henry Cabot Lodge to unknown recipient. Embassy
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National Security Strategy of the United States of
America, September 2002
“Ethical Conditions Outlined for U.S. Military
Operation,”
http://www.zenit.org, October 15, 2001
The Pope declared on January 1 and reiterated on
January 10, 2002 that “It is a profanation of religion to proclaim
oneself a terrorist in the name of God, to kill and violate human beings
in the name of God. Terrorist violence, in fact, is contrary to the
faith in God the creator of the human person, a God that takes care of
humanity and loves it.”
“Papal Address on Anniversary of 9/11 Attacks,”
http://www.zenit.org, September 11, 2002
As early as March 2002, the President expressed in a
press conference, “Every world leader that comes to see me, I explain
our concerns about a nation which is not conforming to agreements that
it made in the past; a nation which has gassed her people in the past; a
nation which has weapons of mass destruction and apparently is not
afraid to use them one thing I will not allow is a nation such as Iraq
to threaten our very future by developing weapons of mass destruction.
This concern was illustrated by His Holiness Pope John
Paul II when he addressed the Diplomatic Corps on January 13, 2003
stating, “Ecumenical dialogue between Christians and respectful contact
with other religions, in particular with Islam, are the best remedy for
sectarian rifts, fanaticism or religious terrorism.”
The largest mosque in Europe was inaugurated in 1995
in Rome, the Pope’s diocese; however there is no Church in Riyadh.
“No war on Iraq unless the United Nations allows the
use of force, top Vatican official says,” Associated Press, September
09, 2002.
http://www.cin.org/archives/cinjub/200209/0022.html
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1441, November 08,
2002.
http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror/02110803.htm, The
resolution states that Iraq remains in material breach of council
resolutions relating to Iraq's 1990 invasion of Kuwait and requires that
Baghdad give UNMOVIC and IAEA a complete and accurate declaration of all
aspects of its chemical, biological and nuclear weapons programs and
ballistic missiles systems, as well as information on other chemical,
biological, and nuclear programs that are supposed to be for civilian
purposes, within 30 days or face serious consequences.
Letter to President Bush from His Holiness John Paul
II, October 21, 2002.
Papal address to the Diplomatic Corps to the Holy See, January 13,
2003
Michael Novak, “Asymmetrical Warfare and the Just War” Delivered on
February 10, 2003 at the American Studies Center, Rome.
George Weigel, “Moral Clarity in a Time of War” William E. Simon
Lecture, October 24, 2002, Washington, D.C.
Statement to Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar, February 27, 2003
“The Word From Rome,” National Catholic Reporter, February 21, 2003.
“Papal Envoy meets Bush, reiterates Vatican opposition to Iraqi war,”
Catholic News Service, March 06, 2003.
National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September
2002
“Pained by War, John Paul II Prays for Iraqi People,”
www.zenit.org, March 20, 2003
www.zenit.org, March 19, 2003
Archbishop Tauran’s Interview with Familglia Cristiana, March 2003
Catholic News Service, April 10, 2003
President Bush Address to the 51 st Annual Prayer Breakfast, February
6, 2003. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030206-1.html
“The Word From Rome,” National Catholic Reporter, January 31, 2003.
“Remarks by President Bush and His Holiness Pope John Paul II, July
23, 2001, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/07/20010723-1.html
“Remarks by the President to the People of Poland,” May 31, 2003,
http://www.usinfo.pl/bushvisit2003/wawel.htm |